


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THEOLOGY
AND THE
SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT





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
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OF
MACAULAY'S TEACHING
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SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT.



A REVIEW
OF
MACAULAY'S TEACHING
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THEOLOGY,
TO THE
SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT.

BY
KUKLOS.
(JOHN HARRIS.)

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ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF
THEOLOGY,
TO THE
SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT.

PART I.

MACAULAY'S REVIEW OF GLADSTONE ON
CHURCH AND STATE.*

In commencing our notice of this work it is desirable, in the first place, to define the nature and object of the remarks which we wish to place before the reader.

The reader is, therefore, requested to take note that it is not the Essay by Gladstone on Church and State, but the critical Review of that Essay, by Macaulay, which we purpose to bring under particular consideration.

In his Review Macaulay extracts certain statements from the Essay, which statements he considers to comprise the essential opinions of Gladstone on the connection of theology with the science of government; these statements are critically examined and, in a great measure, objected to as unsound. In those objections, together with certain positive opinions of his own based upon those objections, is set forth the doctrine of Macaulay himself on the same subject.

* Critical and Historical Essays. Contributed to the Edinburgh Review, by Lord Macaulay. Authorized edition.
Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1874.

As to the merits or demerits of the Essay, as a whole, independently of the parts subjected to critical examination by Macaulay, we do not purpose to enquire. Our remarks are to be confined to the quotations in the Review from the Essay, and to the Review itself.*

The author of the Essay, who, at the time of its publication, was described by Macaulay as "a young man of distinguished parliamentary talents" and "the rising hope of the Tory party," has since occupied a most prominent place as a practical politician, and for a considerable time has held the leadership in the administration of the public affairs of the empire.

The subject of the Essay is nationally of primary importance: of an importance in degree secondary to no other subject.

The reviewer may be considered the most influential national teacher of modern times; one whose opinions and judgments are looked upon by a very large section of the educated English public as almost a decisive settlement of those questions to which his attention was especially directed, and upon which he has vouchsafed to instruct his readers.

The case, therefore, as now presented to us may be thus stated:—A subject in a national sense of the greatest importance is brought before the public by a young man whose reputation and abilities are sufficient to attract particular attention to his statements; his work is subjected to critical examination, and, unless we are much mistaken as to the verdict of the educated public, the result is that his statements have been refuted, his doctrines controverted, and a judgment on the general question, antagonistic to his, triumphantly established as

* We should say that out of a thousand persons who read the Review not more than one will have read the Essay. In expressing this opinion we do not intend any disparagement to the merits of the Essay but to justify ourselves in confining our remarks to the Review and the quotations contained in it.

indisputable. Assuming that we are correct as to the conclusion come to by the public on the case, we are of opinion that such conclusion is false, and that it is particularly mischievous because looked upon as a conclusion, that is, as a judgment come to in a manner to be considered a final decision of the question. The reader of the Review is made to feel that he has had both sides of the question brought under the consideration of his reason ; that the general question, together with its divisions and subdivisions, has been made plain and intelligible, and that, finally, he has had the guidance of a mind of the greatest sagacity and ability to assist his own in summing up the evidence and arranging the judgment.

It cannot be disputed that a false judgment is oftentimes a source of danger to him that holds or entertains it, and that the danger is proportioned to the importance of the question upon which such false judgment is held.

Here then, if, as we opine, the judgment be false, we have the case of a false national judgment * on a question of the gravest national importance ; hence, national danger ; ending eventually, it may be, in national disaster.

A characteristic of Macaulay's writings is a clearness of statement, an apparent desire to make himself perfectly intelligible, and a reliance upon what may be termed common-sense-reason to convince his reader. The form or manner of his method is essentially scientific (mathematical) ; if, therefore, his conclusion on any subject be disputed, the objector should be prepared to show, either that his connected arguments are not fundamentally based on fact, that they have not the requisite co-relation and connection, or that the arguments are in themselves faulty and not reliable as links in a complete chain of reasoning.

* A national judgment is the judgment of a considerable majority of the educated public belonging to the nation, expressed through the intellectual representatives of the nation.

We purpose now to examine analytically the Review, in order to substantiate the opinion we have already expressed that the conclusion come to therein, is essentially false.

THE REVIEW.—(1) “Mr. Gladstone seems to us to be, in many respects, exceedingly well qualified for philosophical investigation. His mind is of large grasp; nor is he deficient in dialectical skill. But he does not give his intellect fair play. There is no want of light, but a great want of what Bacon would have called dry light. Whatever Mr. Gladstone sees is refracted and distorted by a false medium of passions and prejudices. His style bears a remarkable analogy to his mode of thinking, and indeed exercises great influence on his mode of thinking. His rhetoric, though often good of its kind, darkens and perplexes the logic which it should illustrate. Half his acuteness and diligence, with a barren imagination and a scanty vocabulary, would have saved him from almost all his mistakes. He has one gift most dangerous to a speculator, a vast command of a kind of language, grave and majestic, but of vague and uncertain import; of a kind of language which affects us much in the same way in which the lofty diction of the Chorus of Clouds affected the simple hearted Athenian.

ὦ γῆ τοῦ φθεγματος, ὡς ἱερὸν, καὶ σεμνὸν, καὶ τερατώδες.

When propositions have been established, and nothing remains but to amplify and decorate them, this dim magnificence may be in place. But if it is admitted into a demonstration, it is very much worse than absolute nonsense; just as that transparent haze, through which the sailor sees capes and mountains of false sizes and in false bearings, is more dangerous than utter darkness. Now, Mr. Gladstone is fond of employing the phraseology of which we speak in those parts of his works which require the utmost perspicuity and precision of which human language is capable; and, in this way, he deludes

first himself, and then his readers. The foundations of his theory which ought to be buttresses of adamant, are made out of the flimsy materials which are fit only for perorations. This fault is one which no subsequent care or industry can correct. The more strictly Mr. Gladstone reasons on his premises, the more absurd are the conclusions which he brings out; and, when at last his good sense and good nature recoil from the horrible practical inferences to which this theory leads, he is reduced sometimes to take refuge in arguments inconsistent with his fundamental doctrines, and sometimes to escape from the legitimate consequences of his false principles under cover of equally false history."

In these introductory remarks of the reviewer we note (1) a charge of passion and prejudice on the part of Mr. Gladstone, (2) a somewhat severe animadversion upon a want of distinctness in his statements; and (3) the expression of a positive judgment that the foundations of his theory are made out of flimsy material, that his arguments are inconsistent with his fundamental doctrines, and that his principles are false.

(1) A charge of passion and prejudice, unless supported by evidence, is no part of reasonable argument; it may have an effect in influencing the judgment of the audience in the first instance, but, if unsubstantiated, its legitimate effect is an inference that the party making such accusation has been himself influenced by passion and prejudice

(2.) We have no inclination whatever to defend the use of language of a vague and uncertain import when the object is to demonstrate the truth and soundness of propositions of great importance, but, on the contrary, we quite concur with Macaulay that the greater the importance of the subject the more necessary it becomes to require "the utmost perspicuity and precision of which human language is capable." Whether the reviewer's complaints on this head are justly applicable to the case

of this particular Essay we do not offer an opinion, but we will remark that this charge appears to be, at least in a measure, contradicted by the observations which succeed it: thus, "The more strictly Mr. Gladstone reasons on his premises, the more absurd are the conclusions which he brings out," the logical inference from which is that Mr. Gladstone does, sometimes at least, reason strictly on his premises.

(3.) We come to the last charge, that the premises or fundamental principles are themselves false; in respect to which we may, in the first place, observe that if this be indeed so, it is not only majestic language of a grave and uncertain import which will be useless for the purpose of deducing a sound conclusion, but that language of the utmost perspicuity and precision, even if assisted by aptness of illustration, readiness of expression and wittiness in statement, will not avail to bring out a sound, true and reliable conclusion from premises or fundamental principles which are in themselves unsound and false.

THE REVIEW:—(2.) "Mr. Gladstone's whole theory rests on this great fundamental proposition, that the propagation of religious truth is one of the principal ends of government, as government. If Mr. Gladstone has not proved this proposition, his system vanishes at once."

We cannot admit that Macaulay's own reasoning on the case under consideration is, as a whole, by any means so perspicuous as he seems to suppose, but we are clear that his reasoning includes, more or less distinctly set forth, three assumptions in regard to the proposition just stated:—

1st. That if Mr. Gladstone's fundamental proposition be not wholly true it must be necessarily wholly untrue.

2nd. That if the proposition be untrue, its negative or opposite must be true.

3rd. That if the fundamental or primary proposition be untrue, the secondary propositions connected with it

are therefore also untrue ; in other words, " if Mr. Gladstone has not proved his fundamental proposition, his system vanishes at once," and all the statements, principles, and arguments which he has introduced into his system may be considered false and unfounded.

Now to these three assumptions severally and collectively we object ; we decline to accept them as manifestly true, and we do not find that they are substantiated or supported by argument.

Upon the negative of Mr. Gladstone's proposition, which he assumes to be sound because that proposition is unsound, Macaulay proceeds to base and construct his own positive doctrine, which is, in a measure, an inversion of that to which it is opposed. The careful examination of Macaulay's own doctrine is the particular subject to which our remarks are to have especial reference, but, because we find reason to object to his fundamental proposition and doctrines, we do not feel therefore called upon to endorse Mr. Gladstone's as wholly true ; on the contrary, we shall hold ourselves quite at liberty to accept a part and to reject a part thereof ; and, moreover, we shall not, because we find his (Macaulay's) fundamental principles erroneous and unsound, pronounce his statements and arguments to be therefore *all* untrue.

Macaulay commences his refutation of Gladstone's fundamental proposition by some remarks and statements which profess to be prefatory, or preliminary, and which he seems to suppose will be accepted at once as self-evident ; but it very soon appears that he has commenced with a foregone conclusion, has from the very outset condemned Mr. Gladstone's proposition as absolutely wrong, and has assumed his own to be indisputably right.

Since Macaulay's own fundamental proposition is gradually evolved from a number of negative statements, rather than directly stated as a positive concrete proposition, it may facilitate a clear comprehension of the

actual relations of the argument if we put at once before the reader a definite statement in a positive form of that fundamental proposition. But, in order to do this the more satisfactorily, it is desirable to give at the same time a fuller and clearer definition of the fundamental proposition to which Macaulay's is opposed.

The statement "that the propagation of religious truth is one of the principal ends of government," is not fundamental. Evidently behind this there must be a conviction or belief that religious truth has, in fact, a particular definite relationship to human government; so that, in consequence of such relationship, it becomes one of the principal ends of government to propagate religious truth. The proposition affirming the close relationship of religious truth to government must be therefore primary to the other which is dependent upon it; moreover, it is evident that the primary proposition must contain such definition of the expression 'religious truth' that the secondary proposition may become definite and intelligible. The religious truth here referred to must not only have a distinctly recognized and definite meaning, but, since it is constantly related to government which has a general and universal character, so must the religious truth be that which also has a general and universal character.

Whether the affirmative proposition, as we shall now state it, does, or does not, precisely harmonize with Mr. Gladstone's Essay, independently of the Review, is not, as we have already explained, of any particular consequence in regard to our present argument.

(a) Primary affirmative proposition (Gladstone's).

That the temporal government of man by man is based upon and subject to the government of man by God..... The human government is controlled and regulated indirectly by the continual operation of Divine laws; it is also controlled and regulated directly and immediately by the occasional (very frequent) interference of spiritual

agency....Hence, practical theology belongs necessarily and indispensably to good government.

(b) Primary negative proposition (Macaulay's).

That the temporal government of man by man is quite independent of the Spiritual Government of man by GodAssuming that there is or may be a God, or Gods, it is certain that He does not interfere with the general and universal laws under which human beings exist, and, that there is no spiritual control whatever exercised at any time over the temporal affairs of human beings during their terrestrial existence.....Hence, good government has no business to concern itself about practical theology, with which it has no necessary or desirable connection.

For ourselves, we affirm the first (a) and, consequently, reject the second (b) of these propositions.

The introductory argument of Macaulay, which in our opinion, as already stated, commences by begging (prejudging) the question in controversy, reads thus:—(3) “We are desirous, before we enter on the discussion of this important question, to point out clearly a distinction which, though very obvious, seems to be overlooked by many excellent people. In their opinion, to say that the ends of government are temporal and not spiritual is tantamount to saying that the temporal welfare of man is of more importance than his spiritual welfare. But this is an entire mistake. The question is not whether spiritual interests be or be not superior in importance to temporal interests, but whether the machinery which happens at any moment to be employed for the purpose of protecting certain temporal interests of a society be necessarily such a machinery as is fitted to promote the spiritual interests of that society. Without a division of labor the world could not go on. It is of very much more importance that men should have food than that they should have pianofortes. Yet it by no means follows that every pianoforte maker ought to add the business of a baker to his own; for, if he did

so, we should have both much worse music and much worse bread. It is of much more importance that the knowledge of religious truth should be widely diffused than that the art of sculpture should flourish amongst us. Yet it by no means follows that the Royal Academy ought to unite with its present functions those of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, to distribute theological tracts, to send forth missionaries, to turn out Nollekens for being a Catholic, Bacon for being a Methodist, and Flaxman for being a Swedenborgian. For the effect of such folly would be that we should have the worst possible Academy of Arts, and the worst possible Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge. The community, it is plain, would be thrown into universal confusion, if it were supposed to be the duty of every association which is formed for one good object to promote every other good object."

In the first part of these remarks it is taken for granted that the only connection which it is possible to suppose between theology and government is a connection similar to that between the business of a pianoforte maker and that of a baker, which is equivalent to saying, in other words, that it is impossible to reasonably suppose any actual, immediate and necessary connection between them. The preliminary remarks seem to us sufficient to show at once that Macaulay has here entered upon a very grave subject of discussion without an adequate endeavour to understand the fundamental relations of the subject upon which he proposes to instruct the public. If, however, it should be eventually considered that we are in the right in this opinion, there would be excuse for the occasional carelessness and errors of judgment to which writers of even the greatest ability are subject, but in respect to what follows, he has, as it seems to us, rendered himself obnoxious to a charge of inexcusable disingenuousness, or, to use his own expression, to a charge of passion and prejudice. . . . and this on a subject

just previously introduced with protestations of a desire to sift the evidence and to search out the truth of the matter fairly and dispassionately. We say that, taking the quotations given by him from Mr. Gladstone's Essay, Macaulay cannot have supposed that by the expression religious truth merely sectarian differences of opinion about spiritual subjects was intended ; but, not only does he pretend to understand the expression in this sense, it is made to apply also to opinions, which he evidently considers to be of an exaggerated and fanatical character, held only by a very limited number of individuals. If it is suggested that there may be something in the Essay itself to give color to such an extravagant interpretation (perversion) of the meaning of the expression, then we say there is nothing such before the reader of the Review, and Macaulay bases his remarks expressly upon the quotations from the Essay which he puts before the reader.

THE REVIEW :—(4.) “ As to some of the ends of civil government, all people are agreed. That it is designed to protect our persons and our property ; that it is designed to compel us to satisfy our wants, not by rapine, but by industry ; that it is designed to compel us to decide our differences, not by the strong hand, but by arbitration ; that it is designed to direct our whole force, as that of one man, against any other society which may offer us injury ; these are propositions which will hardly be disputed.”

For ourselves, we quite agree that these are some of the ends of civil government.

THE REVIEW :—(5.) “ Now there are matters in which man, without any reference to any higher being, or to any future state, is very deeply interested. Every human being, be he idolator, Mahometan, Jew, Papist, Socinian, Deist or Atheist, naturally loves life, shrinks from pain, desires comforts which can be enjoyed only in communities where property is secure. To be murdered, to be tortured, to be robbed, to be sold into

slavery, these are evidently evils from which men of every religion, and men of no religion, wish to be protected; and therefore it will hardly be disputed that men of every religion, and of no religion, have thus far a common interest in being well governed.”*

Herein we have a portion of that negative fundamental proposition, which we have already put before the reader as Macaulay's, directly stated by himself. The plain meaning may be thus rendered:—So long as men are agreed as to what it is desirable for them to possess and what to be protected from, government can be perfectly well carried on without any reference to any higher being; the Christian and Atheist, the Israelite and the Heathen, are all in the same case; each individual is equally eligible as a good governor, each community has an equal chance of being perfectly well governed, whether the individual or the community believes in a Creator—in a spiritual Governor—in a God, or whether they have no such belief. What is necessary, and alone necessary is—that they shall be intelligent enough to understand that men are in their own right the inheritors and possessors of the earth, and sensible enough to agree as to what things it is especially desirable to have, and to combine together in using the best means to obtain those good things.

The Review thus continues :—(6) “ But the hopes and fears of men are not limited to this short life and to this visible world. He finds himself surrounded by the signs

* We may here again note the disingenuousness of Macaulay, of which we have already complained, in the treatment of so grave and important a subject. Surely, the intelligent reader will agree with us that it is no reasonable inference *because* communities of men have a common interest in certain specified things, that *therefore* there cannot be something else of a more comprehensive character which has also a common interest for them all, and which, moreover, imperatively requires a distinct recognition on the part of them all that it has such an interest; yet, such appears to be the inference which Macaulay wishes and intends the reader to draw from the mode in which this section of the case is presented by him.

of a power and wisdom higher than his own ; and, in all ages and nations, men of all orders of intellect, from Bacon and Newton, down to the rudest tribes of cannibals, have believed in the existence of some superior mind. Thus far the voice of mankind is almost unanimous. But whether there be one God, or many, what may be God's natural and what His moral attributes, in what relation His creatures stand to Him, whether He has ever disclosed Himself to us by any other revelation than that which is written in all the parts of the glorious and well ordered world which He has made, whether His revelation be contained in any permanent record, how that record should be interpreted, and whether it have pleased Him to appoint any unerring interpreter on earth, these are questions respecting which there exists the widest diversity of opinion, and respecting some of which a large part of our race has, ever since the dawn of regular history, been deplorably in error."

Here Macaulay commences with a deliberate statement of what he himself considers to be an established fact, and which, if assumed to be so, alone suffices to involve in the gravest doubt his fundamental proposition, and consequently all those arguments which are based upon it. "Man finds himself surrounded by the signs of a power and wisdom higher than his own ; and, in all ages and nations, men of all orders of intellect, from Bacon and Newton, down to the rudest tribes of cannibals, have believed in the existence of some superior mind." It also appears that this belief distinctly recognizes a particular relationship of the superior mind to men, and to the world they inhabit ; for we read such expressions as "in what relation His creatures stand to Him " and "the parts of the glorious and well ordered world which He has made." So that He is believed by almost all men, including the most intellectual and highly educated, to have been the Creator, and to be still existent. But, then, supposing that the Being, who has created men and

made the well ordered world in which they live, should still continue to take an interest in their welfare, even whilst they remain in the well ordered world which He has made for them to live in. supposing that He chooses to exercise the power, which He must certainly possess, in overruling, regulating, and more or less controlling the temporal affairs of men upon earth, does it seem likely that this would be done in such wise that men would be constantly aware of such spiritual control? But supposing further that He, notwithstanding the vast superiority, should take pleasure in the recognition by men of His gifts. that He should not be pleased to be forgotten by them, and to become unknown to them that He should not choose to have human governments carried on without reference to Him, and, if we may go so far as to suppose that He has made known to men certain strict rules and regulations for the advantageous conduct of their affairs, and has expressly enjoined attention to those rules as commandments from Himself, it is surely not unreasonable to suppose it likely that He may be displeased at a disregard and neglect of His rules, and that He may punish deliberate disobedience to His commandments. We say that, leaving aside the immense amount of positive evidence as to the actual fact, and taking only the statement of Macaulay himself, it is quite reasonable to suppose that the Supreme Being referred to by him does retain in his own hands the supreme control over the temporal affairs of men and over human governments; equally so whether His Sovereignty be desired and recognized or whether it be not. And that this absolute temporal sovereignty may be held conjointly with, and independently of, that spiritual Sovereignty or Headship which belongs to the present terrestrial condition of men as spiritual beings undergoing preparation for a higher state of existence, and which Headship it is left to the free will of men, when they have been instructed and enlightened as to the

conditions and consequences of their choice, to accept or to reject.

We might now turn Macaulay's mode of dealing with an adverse case upon himself. If, taking his own statement, the suppositions we have just put before the reader be in any degree probable, or, even, if they be not unreasonable considered merely as a possibility, then Macaulay "has not proved his fundamental proposition" consequently "his system vanishes at once," and all his arguments and inferences are rendered worthless.

THE REVIEW.—(7) "Now here are two great objects : one is the protection of the persons and estates of citizens from injury ; the other is the propagation of religious truth. No two objects more entirely distinct can well be imagined. The former belongs wholly to the visible and tangible world in which we live ; the latter belongs to that higher world which is beyond the reach of our senses. The former belongs to this life ; the latter to that which is to come. Men who are perfectly agreed as to the importance of the former object, and as to the way of obtaining it, differ as widely as possible respecting the latter object. We must, therefore, pause before we admit that the persons, be they who they may, who are intrusted with power for the promotion of the former object, ought always to use that power for the promotion of the latter object."

We have already said that we do not see how Macaulay can be altogether acquitted of misrepresenting, and of, in some degree, wilfully misrepresenting, the meaning of the expression 'religious truth' for the purpose of weakening the case to which he has opposed himself. But, however this may be, it now becomes evident that in Macaulay's own mind such an expression as religious truth had not a definite and distinct meaning. Political (temporal) theology, mental philosophy, spiritual theology, political (temporal) superstition, spiritual superstition, these things quite distinct from each other, and

some of which are directly antagonistic to each other, are all confounded together by him under the one expression 'religion' or 'religious truth.'

The fundamental proposition which Macaulay has undertaken to disprove, held as an active and positive belief by great numbers of most highly educated men of the highest order of intellect, is here entirely ignored by him and wiped out as though quite unworthy of consideration. Admitting, which he has done, the existence of a Supreme Being, who has created men and made the world for them to live in, the very question in controversy is primarily—does that Supreme Being permit human governments to be carried on without recognition of His sovereignty and power—without His interference and control—without any dependance upon or reference to Him as Supreme Governor, Arbitrator, and Source of Government?

Did it never occur to Macaulay, the historian and the student of history, that the best laid human plans might be thwarted, that the wisest human counsels might be confounded; that unforeseen adverse circumstances might interpose and impede or prevent the carrying out of some highly important national undertaking; that most unreasonable dissension and disaffection might break out amongst the governed; that a mutinous spirit and impatience of control might exhibit itself just at a time when it was supremely desirable for the government to go on smoothly and easily; that, whether in the affairs of an individual, of a commercial company, of a government, or of a nation, failure and disaster might, and in fact do sometimes, present themselves as the result of plans formed with prudence and wisdom, notwithstanding that the endeavour to carry them into effect be made with energy, industry and ability.

Now if good government be in any degree dependant upon the distinct recognition of a Supreme Almighty Governor whose presence, or the presence of whose spi-

ritual agents, amongst men is not made known to them by their bodily eyes, does it not seem desirable, and even imperative, that those who are in the position of Governors who, being instructed and enlightened, recognize such dependence should make known to these whom they govern, and for whom they are in a greater or lesser degree responsible, the necessity of such distinct and active recognition on their part also ? And would not this be the propagation of religious truth in the sense of Gladstone's fundamental proposition ? How then can Macaulay be justified in taking for granted that good human government and the propagation of religious truth cannot have any reasonable connection with each other ? Yet we have here his words :—"No two objects more entirely distinct can well be imagined." It is evident that this is an illogical conclusion resulting in some measure from the very indistinct and confused meaning attached by Macaulay to the expression 'religious truth.' This confused sense becomes still more apparent from what immediately follows. Mr. Gladstone writes in his Essay : "*I do not scruple to affirm that if a Mahometan conscientiously believes his religion to come from God and to teach divine truth, he must believe that truth to be beneficial beyond all other things to the soul of man ; and he must therefore, and ought to, desire its extension, and to use for its extension all proper and legitimate means ; and that, if such Mahometan be a prince, he ought to count among those means the application of whatever influence or funds he may lawfully have at his disposal for such purposes.*"

Upon which the reviewer remarks : (8) "Surely this is a hard saying. Before we admit that the Emperor Julian, in employing the influence and the funds at his disposal for the extinction of Christianity, was doing no more than his duty, before we admit that the Arian Theodoric would have committed a crime if he had suffered a single believer in the divinity of Christ to hold any civil employ-

ment in Italy, before we admit that the Dutch Government is bound to exclude from office all members of the Church of England, the King of Bavaria to exclude from office all Protestants, the Great Turk to exclude from office all Christians, the King of Ava to exclude from office all who hold the unity of God, we think ourselves entitled to demand very full and accurate demonstration. When the consequences of a doctrine are so startling, we may well require that its foundations shall be very solid."

There need not surely be much hesitation in admitting that, if the Emperor Julian fully and sincerely believed it to be his duty to employ the funds and influence at his disposal for the extinction of Christianity, he was doing his duty in so employing them; that, if the Arian Theodoric fully and sincerely believed it a criminal offence to allow a believer in Christ's divinity to hold any civil employment in Italy, he would have committed a crime if he, having the power to prevent had allowed it, and so on; but what we do not admit is that such belief on the part of the Emperor Julian, or of Theodoric, can be correctly termed religious truth. If the Emperor Julian acted in the sincere belief that his duty towards God necessitated his so acting, doubtless the feeling which prompted his acting was a religious feeling, but we deny that it was *truly* religious; it contained a certain small amount of truth mingled with much superstition and ignorance. The result was that in an absolute sense he acted very wrongly, although he may have done so in the belief that he was acting rightly. If he had possessed the knowledge of religious truth which we now possess, he would have known that the acting as he did in respect to the Christians would have the very opposite effect to that of pleasing God. For any one possessed of religious truth to act under a feeling of duty towards God, or, in other words, to perform his duty to God, is to do that which is actually approved

by, and which is absolutely pleasing to God. This is manifest, for otherwise 'Truth' would be something opposed to God's nature instead of being a part of God's nature.

For any human being to possess religious truth in an absolute sense, evidently it must be necessary for that person to be perfectly instructed. Now, the knowledge of human beings is in all cases imperfect; from the very wisest and most highly educated down to the most simple and barbarous there can be but different degrees of ignorance, as considered from the standpoint of absolute knowledge. Since, then, religious beliefs and opinions are in all cases contaminated by ignorance, the true belief being mingled with superstitious beliefs and unsound opinions, it is the duty of those who occupy positions of authority and responsibility * to inculcate and propagate that part of their religious belief and that part only, of which they can be sure that it is true.

THE REVIEW :—(9) "The following paragraph is a specimen of the arguments by which Mr. Gladstone has, as he conceives, established his great fundamental proposition :—"*We may state the same proposition in a more general form, in which it surely must command universal assent. Wherever there is power in the universe, that power is the property of God, the king of that universe—His property of right, however for a time withholden or abused. Now this property, which is, as it were, realized, is used according to the will of the owner, when it is used for the purposes He has ordained, and in the temper of mercy, justice, truth, and faith which He has taught us. But those principles never can be truly, never can be permanently entertained in the human breast, except by a continual reference to their source, and the supply of the Divine Grace. The powers, therefore, that dwell in individuals acting for themselves,*

* All persons who are in any degree educated occupy positions of authority and responsibility.

can only be secured for right uses by applying to them a religion." Here are propositions of vast and indefinite extent conveyed in language which has a certain obscure dignity and sanctity, attractive, we doubt not, to many minds. But the moment that we examine these propositions closely, the moment that we bring them to the test by running over but a very few of the particulars which are included in them, we find them to be false and extravagant. The doctrine which 'must surely command universal assent' is this, that every association of human beings which exercises any power whatever, that is to say, every association of human beings, is bound, as such association, to profess a religion. Imagine the effect which would follow if this principle were really in force during four and twenty hours. Take one instance out of a million. A stage-coach company has power over its horses. This power is the property of God. It is used according to the will of God when it is used with mercy. But the principle of mercy can never be truly or permanently entertained in the human breast without continual reference to God. The powers, therefore, that dwell in individuals, acting as a stage-coach company, can only be secured for right uses by applying to them a religion. Every stage-coach company ought, therefore, in its collective capacity, to profess some one faith, to have its articles, and its public worship, and its tests. That this conclusion, and an infinite number of other conclusions equally strange, follow of necessity from Mr. Gladstone's principle, is as certain as it is that two and two make four. And, if the legitimate conclusions be so absurd, there must be something unsound in the principle."

The proposition of Mr. Gladstone is here presented by him in a form which he states to be general in its application to individuals acting as a government and to individuals acting for themselves; that is, as we understand it, of general application to all governments and to all individuals. But Macaulay at once assumes that, if the

proposition be sound and be applicable to governments and to individuals, it must necessarily be applicable to commercial companies; i.e., to associations of individuals organized and conducted for the exclusive purpose of promoting some one object. We cannot allow that such a similarity obtains between the conditions of the commercial company and those of the individuals or of the government as to justify Macaulay in such assumption: they are not, so to speak, in the same case, whereas the individual and the government are in the same case. So is, also, a nation or a community, each of which has an individuality of its own, in essentially the same case as the individual human being; there is the same complexity of conditions, of responsibilities, of hopes and fears, of good and evil desires, of jealousies and vengeful feelings, of gratitude and resentment, in the nation, the community, or the government, compounded of individual human beings, which obtains in the one individual. But this does not equally apply to the commercial company; the case of such an association may be considered as more nearly equivalent to one phase only of those conditions of human life to which an individual human being is subject. An individual, all of whose life time was devoted exclusively to one occupation, or one kind of occupation, would, to a great extent, typify the commercial company; whereas for an individual type of a nation or a government, an ideal individual engaged in every variety and diverse description of human occupation would be necessary. We submit, therefore, because of this essential difference, which is entirely overlooked and left out of consideration by Macaulay, that the supposed analogy is false, and that the argument, based on this false analogy, would, even if sound and good in itself, be unreliable. But, waiving this objection, let us, for the moment, accept, under protest, the analogy, and examine the worth of the argument.

The immediate object of the mode of argument, here

adopted, is to show that a particular practical application of the general proposition stated by Gladstone, has, for its consequent, a result which is manifestly absurd; let us consider attentively in what manner the adoption of a religion on the one hand, or the entire rejection of all religion, on the other, by such a company, might be expected to express itself. The one company would recognize a duty on its part, not only towards its horses, but also, towards its servants, towards its customers, towards other companies competing with it or allied to it. It would feel an obligation to act with mercy, truth and justice, towards each and all of them. Certainly, the particular object it would keep in view would be to obtain an increase in its wealth, and a remuneration for its labour, and to do this by providing the public with stage-coach accommodation; but it would not exercise cruelty upon its horses, not behave tyrannically towards its servants, not greedily or dishonorably or vexatiously towards tradesmen or towards other companies, for the purpose of increasing its gains to the utmost. The other company is to be supposed to be strictly atheistical; its policy must be purely selfish, it would not trouble itself about what injurious effect its conduct might have upon its successors or upon its contemporaries; it would not spare its servants or its horses, and it would be unscrupulous in its dealings. We do not believe that, in fact, an association of a number of individuals, as a commercial company, could be anywhere found utterly selfish and unprincipled; but this, because we do not believe such an association could be found of which the majority of members, in a strict absolute sense, were atheistical. It may be said that commercial associations utterly unprincipled and selfish could not hold together, and could not, for long, even exist; neither do we assert that they could, but we do assert that a company which professes to be, and is, principled in any degree; which professes to recognize, and does recognize duties in any degree;

which, in its collective capacity, says "no, we might make money by doing so and so, but it would not be legitimate business, it would be dishonorable, we can't do that"—that such a company professes and has adopted a religion, and that it has its faith, its articles and its tests. We do not say that such a profession is, in a reasonable sense, a sufficiently positive and distinct recognition of the Supreme Being, as the source of mercy, justice and truth, and of His temporal government upon earth; we do not even opine that this is the degree of distinctive religious profession which Mr. Gladstone had in mind, but Macaulay's argument is here the immediate subject of consideration, and that argument does not apply to any particular quantity or particular kind of religious profession but to any degree of any kind of religion whatever. The vague and uncertain meaning attached in his mind, to the expression "religious truth," has evidently here again led Macaulay to an illogical conclusion which cannot bear strict examination.

THE REVIEW :—(9) "We will quote another passage of the same sort:—

"Why, then, we now come to ask, should the governing body in a state profess a religion? First, because it is composed of individual men; and they being appointed to act in a definite moral capacity, must sanctify their acts done in that capacity by the offices of religion; inasmuch as the acts cannot otherwise be acceptable to God, or anything but sinful and punishable in themselves. And whenever we turn our face away from God in our conduct, we are living atheistically. In fulfilment, then, of his obligations as an individual, the statesman must be a worshipping man. But his acts are public—the powers and instruments with which he works are public—acting under and by the authority of the law, he moves at his word ten thousand subject arms, and because such energies are thus essentially public, and wholly out of the range of mere individual agency, they must be sanctified, not only by the private personal

prayers and piety of those who fill public situations, but also by public acts of the men composing the public body. They must offer prayer and praise in their public and collective character—in that character wherein they constitute the organ of the nation; and wield its collective force. Wherever there is a reasoning agency there is a moral duty and responsibility involved in it. The governors are reasoning agents for the nation, in their conjoint acts as such. And therefore there must be attached to this agency, as that without which none of our responsibilities can be met, a religion. And this religion must be that of the governor, or none."

"Here again we find propositions of vast sweep; and of sound so orthodox and solemn that many good people we doubt not, have been greatly edified by it. But let us examine the words closely; and it will immediately become plain that, if these principles be once admitted, there is an end of all society. No combination can be formed for any purpose of mutual help, for trade, for public works, for the relief of the sick or of the poor, for the promotion of art or of science, unless the members of the combination agree in their theological opinions. Take any such combination at random, the London and Birmingham Railway Company for example, and observe to what consequences Mr. Gladstone's arguments inevitably lead. "Why should the Directors of the Railway Company, in their collective capacity, profess a religion? First, because the direction is composed of individual men appointed to act in a definite moral capacity, bound to look carefully to the property, the limbs, and the lives of their fellow-creatures, bound to act diligently for their constituents, bound to govern their servants with humanity and justice, bound to fulfil with fidelity many important contracts. They must, therefore, sanctify their acts by the offices of religion, or these acts will be sinful and punishable in themselves. In fulfilment, then, of his obligations as an individual,

the Director of the London and Birmingham Railway must be a worshipping man. But his acts are public. He acts for a body. He moves at his word ten thousand subject arms. And because these energies are out of the range of his mere individual agency, they must be sanctified by public acts of devotion. The Railway Directors must offer prayer and praise in their public and collective character, in that character wherewith they constitute the organ of the Company, and wield its collected power. Wherever there is reasoning agency, there is moral responsibility. The Directors are reasoning agents for the Company. And therefore there must be attached to this agency, as that without which none of our responsibilities can be met, a religion. And this religion must be that of the conscience of the Director himself, or none. There must be public worship and a test. No Jew, no Socinian, no Presbyterian, no Catholic, no Quaker, must be permitted to be the organ of the Company, and to wield its collective force? Would Mr. Gladstone really defend this proposition? We are sure that he would not; but we are sure that to this proposition, and to innumerable similar propositions, his reasoning inevitably leads."

In a great measure, both the foregoing quotations from the Essay, and the reviewer's remarks upon it, merely amplify and repeat those which have preceded them. Mr. Gladstone referring expressly to a Government, as the representative of the nation, embodying the wills, desires, hopes, fears, (passions)...and the intellects, by which these are directed and controlled, of the individuals composing the nation, requires that this collective personality... this representative of the public, shall give expression to its recognition of God, as the Supreme Governor and Controller of the temporal affairs of men, by acts of public prayer and praise. Macaulay, substituting a railway company for the stage-coach company, and having in his mind the prejudice that 'religion' must

necessarily mean a dogmatic set of religious opinions, a system of some one exclusive sectarian character or other, enlarges upon the absurdity of the collective representative of a number of individuals, holding various opinions and beliefs, giving expression, as the mouth-piece of those individuals collectively, to dogmatic opinions of his own which might probably not be wholly concurred in by a single one of those individuals. Underlying this, there is, as we understand the matter, a question of a very serious character. . . . closely related to that main question, involved in the two fundamental propositions, which is the general subject of the present argument. It is, if we mistake not, because Macaulay has prejudged for himself in a very decided manner this question, that a sort of impatience and sense of absurdity attaches itself to his discussion of this subject, and because many of his readers have likewise prejudged the question for themselves, his observations are the more likely to find acceptance and approval on their part. Macaulay appears to have thought it undesirable or unnecessary to distinctly state this question for consideration on its own merits. . . . We will do so. It is, whether upon evidence and experience there be, or be not, reasonable ground for supposing that a positive and distinct profession of religious belief as a guiding and controlling principle in general business, does in fact influence the result; whether the probability of business success be, or be not, in any degree increased thereby. A great number of educated persons have apparently concluded for themselves, as we understand Macaulay to have done, that it is not reasonable to suppose any such difference to result that business success is solely and entirely dependent upon the sagacity, energy, industry, and application of the individual, as possessing in himself a certain greater or lesser degree of ability and capacity, quite independently of any reference to the Supreme Being. There is, also, we feel sure, a very considerable number of educat-

ed persons who have come, more or less decidedly, to the opposite conclusion, and who hold that the practical and distinct profession of religious belief, which belongs of right to the good conduct of business, may be reasonably expected to have a directly potent influence on the successful issue of that business. But of these persons, however numerous they may be, there are, we suppose, but a very few who consider that such conclusion can be safely based upon practical experience, that is to say, upon evidence furnished by the results of ordinary business enterprise. We think the greater number would at once say to such a proposition 'No, the evidence of that kind is at least quite conflicting; indeed, we are inclined to think it would of itself be adverse to the proposition. We firmly believe in God on evidence of quite a different character. . . . We are sure He possesses the power to overrule and directly control the temporal affairs of men if He pleases, and, therefore, we hold it not unreasonable to suppose that occasionally, in some special cases, He does directly interfere in what are called matters of ordinary business.'

Now it seems to us that this last conclusion is not altogether satisfactory; it can scarcely be considered positive, it shelves the particular question rather than deals with it, and may be almost considered as belonging to one of two fundamental opinions about religion between which, as we think, Macaulay was continually halting. Here is the objection to the insufficiency of that doctrine as we have stated it. 'God, as a rule, does not actively and directly interfere. In rare and exceptional cases, perhaps He does because He can, but there is no distinct and unquestionable evidence that He does; the positive here, therefore, admits or includes the negative—perhaps He does not, even in rare and exceptional cases; then, perhaps He never does in any case. But, if He never does in any case, it seems probable that He cannot.

Ah, supposing the universe, as we know it, to be entirely regulated by the operation of unchangeable laws with which no Being does or can interfere. Yes, that seems to be the most reasonable view of the case; there may have been in the first instance a Creator, indeed, there must have been, in some sense, a First Cause; and there may be now, as Macaulay says, "a Superior Mind" in some form or sense; but what we have to do with, and are immediately concerned about, are the unchangeable, never failing, eternal laws of universal nature.'

The conclusion... that the direct exercise of a controlling and regulating power by the Supreme Being over the temporal affairs of men is, if indeed there be any such exercise at any time, of only occasional and rare occurrence... appears to us, as we have stated, unsatisfactory. But, it may be said... "The question is as to fact; and if you admit that the observation of all men, or of nearly all men, has led them to such conclusion—is it not equivalent to admitting that the conclusion is, in fact, sound?" To this we reply... No; because the soundness of the conclusion is not, in the first place, dependent upon the number of the persons who examine the question, but upon the correctness of the process of examination by which the conclusion is arrived at. One chemist might perform a complex analysis in Organic Chemistry, and, if he understood, and was attentive to, all the conditions of the case, *i.e.*, if he performed the analysis correctly, he would obtain the correct result. A thousand or a hundred thousand persons might successively endeavour to perform the same analysis, and, if they all neglected some one or more of the conditions of the case, none of them could obtain the correct result. It is true that when a process is faulty and imperfect, a great number of persons successively engaging in an examination of the same subject are likely to improve the process, and thus eventually arrive at the correct conclusion, each one correcting the mistakes and oversights of his predecessors,

and thus eliminating the error. But, this only applies to cases in which the imperfections of the process and the unreliable character of the conclusion is recognized; because, if it be supposed that the process does not admit of improvement or variation—and the conclusion remains unchallenged, each one who re-examines the case only repeats his predecessor's mistakes.

We will now explain the reasons why, as it seems to us, the conclusion so generally arrived at on this momentous question is quite unreliable; and we will endeavour briefly to indicate the most important of those special conditions and interfering causes which it is imperatively necessary to take into consideration in order that the evidence may be correctly estimated and a sound judgment established as to the facts. To commence the examination of the question, we have for a basis the fundamental proposition (a) * by which it is affirmed that God is the Supreme Sovereign over all nations. . . . the Supreme Governor and Arbitrator over the temporal affairs of men as human beings in their present state of existence upon the earth; and that He, the same Being, is conjointly and independently the Spiritual Head or Father of those men who, as spiritual beings, accept His spiritual rule with the conditions thereof.

Affirming as we do, this proposition, it immediately follows (keeping in view the particular subject and character of the enquiry) that any examination of the question, in which this two-fold relationship of the Supreme Being to men is not clearly recognized... and in which the complex conditions which must result as consequents are left out of consideration.. cannot lead to a reliable conclusion. For example:—a person, who, not having cognized the primary conditions of the case, examines some of the evidence, reports thus.. ‘I can find no uniformity of result to indicate the exercise of a divine

* Which we have called Gladstone's.—(See page 10.)—and which is here somewhat amplified.

regulating power. If God who is perfectly good, exercise direct and active control over the temporal affairs of men, one might reasonably expect all good men engaged in business to succeed, and all bad men to fail ; and so, also, some decided difference in favour of comparatively good and just nations, should be apparent.²

Here, keeping in mind the fundamental proposition, we have, in the first place, to examine the value of the expressions 'good' and 'bad' respectively in relation to the particular conditions. As the terms good and bad are comparative, let us, for the purpose of the examination, define 'a good man' compared with 'a bad' or 'a worse man' as, . . . he who is most active and thorough in his obedience to the rules and laws of God.* The question here relates to the conditions of man's terrestrial existence. . . . the good man engaged in business who, as a consequence of his good conduct, is expected to be more successful than his comparatively bad neighbour is, as a man in business on earth, related to God as his Supreme temporal Governor. What then, in this relation, are the rules and laws of God, by active and thorough obedience to which his good conduct is to be estimated. Taking for granted the laws of the Decalogue as primary, let us enumerate some of the most important of the secondary rules or laws of God, to which the obedience of the man engaged in business is imperatively required :

DILIGENCE,	SELF-DENIAL AND TEMPERANCE,
PERSEVERENCE,	LIBERALITY AND TOLERANCE,
MENTAL ACTIVITY,	COURTESY AND CHARITY,
PUNCTUALITY,	REGULARITY AND METHOD,
STRICTNESS IN THE THOROUGH	PROMOTION OF PUBLIC OR
FULFILLMENT OF COMMERCIAL	NATIONAL WORKS OF
ENGAGEMENTS.	UTILITY.

Now we say, without doubt or hesitation, that these just enumerated are some of the most important of the forms by strict attention to which a man's active obedience, as a man engaged in business, to the rules and commandments of the Supreme temporal Ruler of the

*That is strictly speaking.....in his endeavour to obey the known rules and laws of God.

Earth must express itself. A man who excels in the thoroughness of his obedience to these rules, or even to most of them, may be correctly considered a comparatively 'good man' in the terrestrial or material sense merely; and, on supposition of a direct and active Divine regulation of the temporal affairs of men, the probability, at least, is suggested that he would be considered deserving, and would receive a portion of those substantial rewards which belong especially to the terrestrial life of human beings as men. But it by no means follows that the same man would be, even comparatively, 'a good man' in a spiritual sense, in that sense from disregard to the expressed wishes of his Maker that he should prefer the higher interests of his spiritual nature to the earthly desires of his bodily nature, and non-compliance with His injunction to prepare himself for a higher state of existence, he might be quite undeserving. On the other hand, we may suppose a man who had recognized the superior importance of his spiritual interests—had persevered in constant endeavours to fulfill the higher duties of his nature—to overcome his spiritual faults, and to make the required preparation for a higher state of existence, but who, at the same time, had been very inattentive, on merely terrestrial (material) subjects, to the rules and laws of the Supreme temporal Ruler of the earth. In that relationship in which the man, last supposed, had neglected the commandments and requirements of the Judge of all the earth, he could not reasonably expect to be held deserving of those terrestrial rewards which belong especially to that relationship.

But the visible complexity in the conditions surrounding the terrestrial existence of the human being, which thus becomes apparent, is yet greatly increased when we come to the consideration of the case in which a man, having been attentive and actively obedient in respect to the temporal rules and requirements of his

terrestrial existence, becomes aware that he has been neglectful of the higher duties belonging to his compound nature, and becomes sincerely and earnestly desirous to be instructed and assisted in understanding and fulfilling the conditions and requirements attaching to the welfare of his spiritual existence. The man, having accepted the primary conditions, earnestly requests (prays to) the Spiritual Head, to whom he is told to apply for special instruction and assistance, to guide and direct him, and to so modify the conditions and circumstances by which he is surrounded as to facilitate his becoming able to comprehend and fulfil his spiritual duties. What ought the man to reasonably expect, or to be prepared for, if his earnest request be complied with? Let us suppose the man to have already learnt that one of the primary conditions is that, whenever there be a conflict of interests, he shall give heed to the welfare of his soul and to the interests of his spiritual existence, in preference to those interests, and to the indulgence of those desires, belonging only to his temporal existence. Let us further suppose that to do this practically and effectually, although he understands theoretically that it is to be done and wishes to do it, constitutes a preliminary difficulty to him of a very serious (almost insurmountable) character. We will suppose, moreover, that amongst the man's outlying faults as a spiritual being is a certain amount of personal vanity and of habitual bodily (sensual) indulgence, and that these faults, although not, perhaps, comparatively speaking, by any means great in degree, may be sufficient to bar the way of, or to greatly impede his progress in spiritual improvement, in the first instance. . . . These being some of the circumstances of the case, and the man having made his earnest request for especial instruction and assistance, as we have supposed, what should he reasonably expect? His business affairs go wrong—his favorite schemes miscarry—untoward circumstances of an accidental character which he could

not foresee, occur at the most unfortunate moment—he suffers very heavy pecuniary loss—perhaps his business, which not long since was apparently sound and flourishing, after a succession of disasters comes to an end in bankruptcy. Or, let us suppose—that the man's health, which has been previously almost always good, fails—he becomes sickly—is unable to enjoy his usual bodily comforts and almost unable to attend to business—has a severe illness and only partially recovers with his personal appearance much disfigured.

Does the man recognise and accept this as a reasonable answer to his prayer? If he has been sincere and fully in earnest, if he has persistence and patience, if he has a disposition to trust his Spiritual Guide, and to distrust his own independent judgment, it is most probable that he will eventually come to the conclusion that this was the best and most reasonable answer to his prayer—that his request had thus been granted in the manner most favorable and advantageous to him. It is, however, very doubtful whether he would at first thus accept the circumstance; it is quite probable that he would for some time continue to misunderstand it; and, not impossible that, dimly understanding it, instead of gratitude, he might feel resentment and discontent—instead of a more earnest desire to go forward, he might regret the temerity which had brought him into such an unpleasant situation; and, perchance, instead of renewed request for further instruction and guidance, might end by prayer to be allowed to return to (the flesh-pots) the pleasant place he had been accustomed to, and there to be left to himself. Putting aside, however, the man's own estimate of his own case—his own interpretation of the events which had befallen him... what would be the opinion which the majority of his neighbours would be likely to entertain and express about them? Mr. So and So, has got into all sorts of trouble lately—seems to meet with nothing but misfortunes now—some people

think he's getting wrong in the head; to talk with him there don't seem to be anything particular the matter, but they say he's got very religious of late—very serious views about a spiritual existence—just what comes of that sort of superstitious nonsense—used to be a sensible man—pity he could-n't be satisfied with the world as it is, and continue to enjoy himself—anyway those sort of speculations had best be left to the parsons—their business; what can people expect who will torment themselves with all sorts of visionary fancies instead of being satisfied with their own business; and—so on.

This will be sufficient for the present to distinctly indicate the character of the secondary conditions (so to speak) which greatly interfere with and complicate the reasonable result, and which, consequently, render extremely difficult and abstruse an examination which, at first sight, appears to be of a comparatively simple character, not requiring any particular experience and knowledge of the rules of analysis to conduct.

THE REVIEW . . . (10) " Again,

" National will and agency are indisputably one, binding either a dissentient minority or the subject body, in a manner that nothing but the recognition of the doctrine of national personality can justify. National honour and faith are words in every one's mouth. How do they less imply a personality in nations than the duty towards God, for which we now contend? They are strictly and essentially distinct from the honour and good faith of the individuals composing the nation. France is a person to us, and we to her. A wilful injury done to her is a moral act, and a moral act quite distinct from the acts of all the individuals composing the nation. Upon broad facts like these we may rest, without resorting to the more technical proof which the laws afford in their manner of dealing with corporations. If, then, a nation have unity of will, have pervading sympathies, have capability of reward and suffering contingent upon its acts, shall we deny its responsibility;

its need of a religion to meet that responsibility? A nation then having a personality, lies under the obligation, like the individuals composing its governing body, of sanctifying the acts of that personality by the offices of religion, and thus we have a new and imperative ground for the existence of a state religion."

A new ground we have here, certainly, but whether very imperative may be doubted. Is it not perfectly clear, that this argument applies with as much force to every combination of human beings for a common purpose, as to governments? Is there any such combination in the world, whether technically a corporation or not, which has not this collective personality, from which Mr. Gladstone deduces such extraordinary consequences? Look at banks, insurance offices, dock companies, canal companies, gas companies, hospitals, dispensaries, associations for the relief of the poor, associations for apprehending malefactors, associations of medical pupils for procuring subjects, associations of country gentlemen for keeping fox-hounds, book societies, benefit societies, clubs of all ranks, from those which have lined Pall Mall and St. James' street with their palaces, down to the Free-and-easy which meets in the shabby parlour of a village inn. Is there a single one of these combinations to which Mr. Gladstone's argument will not apply as well as to the State? In all these combinations, in the Bank of England, for example, or in the Athenæum club, the will and agency of the society are one, and bind the dissentient minority. The Bank and the Athenæum have a good faith and a justice different from the good faith and justice of the individual members. The Bank is a person to those who deposit bullion with it. The Athenæum is a person to the butcher and wine-merchant. If the Athenæum keeps money at the Bank, the two societies are as much persons to each other as England and France. Either society may pay its debts honestly; either may try to

defraud its creditors ; either may increase in prosperity ; either may fall into difficulties. If, then, they have this unity of will : if they are capable of doing and suffering good and evil, can we, to use Mr. Gladstone's words, "deny their responsibility, or their need of a religion to meet that responsibility ?" Joint-stock banks, therefore, and clubs, "having a personality lie under the necessity of sanctifying that personality by the offices of religion ;" and thus we have "a new and imperative ground" for requiring all the directors and clerks of joint-stock banks, and all the members of clubs, to qualify by taking the sacrament."

To the question at the commencement of Macaulay's critical remarks on the foregoing quotation.... "Is it not perfectly clear that this argument applies with exactly as much force to every combination of human beings for a common purpose as to governments ?".... we have no hesitation in replying, It is not perfectly clear that it so applies, but, on the contrary, it is perfectly clear that it does not apply with nearly so much force to any of the combinations mentioned by Macaulay ; and to many kinds of combinations or associations it does not apply at all ; for example, a cricket club, a chess club, a skating club, or a dancing club.... It is somewhat strange that Macaulay's own instance of the "Free-and-easy which meets in the shabby parlour of a village inn," did not suggest to him a suspicion of the mistake he was committing.

The nature of the mistake we have already pointed out and dwelt upon:—namely, that a combination, association, or club of individuals, having for its object the promoting or carrying into effect some one special object, is not analogous to an individual ; it may be considered as having a special personality related to that one object ; but has not a general personality related to all objects, analogous to the general personality of the individual. Now a government has such a general

personality quite analogous to that of the individual. For illustration, let us take a musical club of associated musicians, individuals each of whom has a fondness for and knowledge of music; evidently the club will have a personality in relation to music, it will interest itself in subjects belonging to music, it may express opinions and judgments on such subjects which, because of the collective knowledge of the club, will be recognised by individual musicians and by other musical clubs as entitled to attention and respect.* No doubt the club as a unit or personality has a responsibility, but it is a responsibility of a very limited and one-sided character. To entertain the supposition that the responsibilities of such a club, or of its president, are exactly analogous to those of a nation, or of the prime minister at the head of a nation, is manifestly unreasonable. To opine that a club, the especial object of which is amusement or exercise, should employ itself, as such club, in prayer, would be very much equivalent to thinking that an individual man whenever he engages in amusement or physical exercise should be employed in prayer; which, again, is equivalent to saying that a man ought never to engage in amusement or physical exercise. But, because such a doctrine would be unreasonable, or as Macaulay expresses it absurd, does it therefore follow that it is not reasonable or right for a man to employ any part of his time in prayer and praise?

* Macaulay's rather dangerous method of using the 'argumentum ad absurdum' may be here applied, by supposing the society of associated musicians to give its opinion, as a musical society, on some difficult case in surgery; or, as to which of the two favourite theories of the glacial epoch in Geology is to be preferred. But there would be no absurdity in the same individual, who was a member of the musical society, belonging also to the society of surgeons and to a geological society. And, so likewise, the government, through its educational duties, is equally related to all such societies; because it is a most important duty of government to supervise and to take care that sound instruction is provided on all subjects, in each division of knowledge.

THE REVIEW :—(11)

“The truth is, that Mr. Gladstone has fallen into an error very common among men of less talents than his own. It is not unusual for a person who is eager to prove a particular proposition to assume a *major* of huge extent, which includes that particular proposition, without ever reflecting that it includes a great deal more. The fatal facility with which Mr. Gladstone multiplies expressions stately and sonorous, but of indeterminate meaning, eminently qualifies him to practise this sleight on himself and on his readers. He lays down broad general doctrines about power, when the only power of which he is thinking is the power of governments, and about conjoint action, when the only conjoint action of which he is thinking is the conjoint action of citizens in a state. He first resolves on his conclusion. He then makes a *major* of most comprehensive dimensions, and having satisfied himself that it contains his conclusion, never troubles himself about what else it may contain : and as soon as we examine it we find that it contains an infinite number of conclusions, every one of which is a monstrous absurdity.”

Taking the quotations from the Essay, furnished by Macaulay, to which his remarks are addressed, we opine that his strictures on the method, as well as on the matter, of Mr. Gladstone's argument are quite unfounded; the conclusions “each of which is a monstrous absurdity” are not, it is evident, contained in Mr. Gladstone's *major*, nor do they belong at all to those parts of the Essay which Macaulay puts before the reader.

THE REVIEW :—(12)

“It is perfectly true that it would be a very good thing if all the members of all the associations in the world were men of sound religious views. We have no doubt that a good christian will be under the guidance of christian principles, in his conduct as director of a canal company or steward of a charity dinner. If he

were to recur to a case which we have before put, a member of a stage-coach company, he would, in that capacity, remember that 'a righteous man regardeth the life of his beast.' "

This statement is very noteworthy in connection with the remarks of Macaulay which immediately precede it. It appears to be quite opposed to his argument, and includes logically, as we understand it, an admission that he is wrong in fact. Let us consider it a little attentively.... "It is perfectly true that".... So, then, here is a very positive expression of Macaulay's experience;—of Macaulay's, whose experience, from special study of the evidence recorded in history, was greater than that of the generality of men. But, if so certainly a very good thing that men should hold sound religious views—how can it be absurd for them to profess or to give expression to those views? The contradiction appears to have struck Macaulay himself for the moment, and an explanation is offered in the words:—"But it does not follow that every association of men must, therefore, as such association, profess a religion." Now Mr. Gladstone has not said either directly or inferentially that every association of men must;.... what he has said is that each nation is required to do so, and ought to do so, through its exponent the government. If the object of an association were professedly of a religious character, it would be proper for that association to profess religion; this much Macaulay would readily admit. But, *therefore*, it is neither absurd nor unreasonable for some associations to profess religion. It is right for an individual to profess religion, and, at certain times, to give expression to his religious belief by prayer and praise.... granted. Then, it is right for a number of individuals to do so.... Then, it is right for a great number of individuals, combined or associated as a nation, to do so, and, at certain times, to give expression to the national religious belief by prayer and praise,

through the responsible exponent and executive of the national personality, which is the government of the nation.

The technical subject of argument is whether it be right for the government of a nation to propagate religious truth. Macaulay has just admitted, or stated in the most decided manner, that it would be a very good thing if all men were of sound religious views. But, then, if some men are of sound religious views, and some men are not, surely it must be right for those who are, knowing it would be better for the others to be so also, to endeavour to persuade and instruct the others. It is quite certain, moreover, that men who are of what Macaulay considers to be, sound religious views, have a decided conviction that it is their imperative duty so to act. If, therefore, it be right and an imperative duty for a number of them so to act as individuals—is it not also right and imperative for those men associated together as a nation, or as the government of a nation, to act nationally in the same manner?

THE REVIEW :—(13)

“It is evident that many great and useful objects can be attained in this world only by co-operation. It is equally evident that there cannot be efficient co-operation, if men proceed on the principle that they must not co-operate for one object unless they agree about other objects. Nothing seems to us more beautiful or admirable in our social system than the facility with which thousands of people, who perhaps agree only on a single point, can combine their energies for the purpose of carrying that single point. We see daily instances of this. Two men, one of them obstinately prejudiced against missions, the other president of a missionary society, sit together at the board of a hospital, and heartily concur in measures for the health and comfort of the patients. Two men, one of whom is a zealous upporter and the other a zealous opponent of the sys-

tem pursued in Lancaster's schools, meet at the mendicancy society, and act together with the utmost cordiality. The general rule we take to be undoubtedly this, that it is lawful and expedient for men to unite in an association for the promotion of a good object, though they may differ with respect to other objects of still higher importance."

This section of Macaulay's argument, again, with the examples by which it is supported, appears to us to be quite opposed to his conclusion as to the impracticability of men, associated for the express promotion of some useful object, professing and practising religious truth in common. The agreement on the part of the individuals to combine and to recognise the necessity of charity and self-restraint notwithstanding the diversity of their opinions on many questions, implies a recognition also that the knowledge of each individual and the collective knowledge of the society on many questions is limited, uncertain and disorderly; that nevertheless there is perfect knowledge, certainty and order above and around them; that it is the duty of each to assist his fellows in those things which both can feel sure are useful and true; that the useful is in fact distinct from the useless, the right from the wrong; that the God of the useful and right is the Supreme Governor to whom their service is due;—that the Governor of all the earth requires and claims their services in that which they know to be useful and right....all these belong to religious truth.

It may perhaps be said—as it has been said before—'it would be much better not to have all these prejudices, uncertainties and differences of opinion; if there be a Supreme Governor who has created and now regulates the world, and who knows with certainty what is right and true, why is it not so arranged that men can clearly understand what is right, and work harmoniously together on all subjects?' This may appear for the

moment, perhaps, plausible and not unreasonable, but it will be found, as soon as examined, not really to belong to any argument. If a Creator is not believed in—if the existence of a Supreme Governor is denied, it is evident that such a question will be superfluous and out of place. On the other hand, if the fundamental basis of the argument be a belief in God as the allwise and almighty Creator, or as the Supreme Being whose wisdom and intelligence immensely exceeds that of man; then, again, such a question, as an argument, is quite out of place and inadmissible. Evidently, the only reasonable conclusion in that case is that the arrangements have been made such as they are for good and sufficient reasons. . . . Whether men, if left entirely to themselves, ever could obtain any certain knowledge as to these reasons, may be considered as, at least, very doubtful, because, if human beings are intended for a future and more complete or perfect state of existence, the strong probability that many of the arrangements and conditions to which they are now subjected, have reference to that future state, at once suggests itself as containing, at least in some measure, the explanation. In other words, granting a future state of existence, the consideration which immediately suggests itself is whether the present life is not, in its most important aspect, an educational process, a scholastic training and practical preparation for that which is to follow. The advantages, immense advantages, conferred by the existing arrangements as the conditions of such an educational process, are not, as it seems to us, by any means difficult to understand in a general sense, nor even to appreciate, in some degree, as to their special adaptation. . . . The individual man finds that to effect any useful purpose he must not isolate himself, must not exclusively indulge his own desires and act according to his own opinions only—he must combine and associate with his fellows. He soon finds that all his opinions are not equally certain—that

many of them require to be modified, some of them to be changed—that only a few of the opinions he at first held were such that he could be reasonably certain as to their truth and soundness. He observes that this is the case not only of himself but equally so of others. Hence, he learns the necessity of tolerance and temperance in order that men may act together and assist each other in association. He finds, after a time, that whilst he has become more distrustful of his individual judgment on many questions, on some few he has become more assured and certain. He finds that those few of his opinions, whenever attacked, have been supported by his reason and instead of being weakened have become stronger and more firmly held. He experiences a particular satisfaction in having retained these opinions, and feels that if he had agreed to give up or modify them he would have done wrong; he observes, therefore, that reasonable tolerance, temperance, and conciliation, do not necessitate or justify the giving up, on the part of the individual, those opinions, which he, after very careful comparison with the opinions of others, still believes to be right. Hence, he learns the difficulty of acquiring sound knowledge; and learns, also, that with persistent care and diligence progress in such acquisition is assured. He finds, as he grows older, the number of questions upon which his mind feels the assurance of certainty are continually, although it may be very slowly, increasing, and that the firmness with which he holds such convictions is becoming continually greater. He observes that this is also true in the case of other individuals; that it holds true in respect to communities of associated individuals; that it is not confined to the terrestrial life of separate individuals but applies also to nations; that the traditional and recorded experience of nations is in agreement with his own practical experience of individual life; that History is essentially a record of the same educational process—the

advantages of association—the selfishness and dogmatism of ignorance—the necessity of submission to discipline and orderly government—the increasing preference for reasonable argument, and reliance on reasonable judgment in place of violence, as a means of deciding differences,—the evils of conflict arising from self-assertion and aggression gradually recognized—international agreement and peaceful settlement of many disputes, arising from such agreement. And, also, . . . the evil consequences of submitting to recognized wrong—the necessity of upholding the freedom of reasonable judgment and of resisting to the utmost the tyranny of human interference with the reasonable freedom of the mind.

THE REVIEW :—(14) “It will hardly be denied that the security of the persons and property of men is a good object, and that the best way, indeed the only way, of promoting that object is to combine men together in certain great corporations which are called states. These corporations are very variously, and, for the most part, very imperfectly organized. Many of them abound with frightful abuses. But it seems reasonable to believe that the worst that ever existed was, on the whole, preferable to complete anarchy.”

“Now, reasoning from analogy, we should say that those great corporations would, like all other associations, be likely to attain their end most perfectly if that end were kept singly in view ; and that to refuse the services of those who are admirably qualified to promote that end, because they are not also qualified to promote some other end, however excellent, seems at first sight as unreasonable as it would be to provide that nobody who was not a fellow of the Society of Antiquaries should be a governor of the Eye Infirmary ; or that nobody who was not a member of the Society for promoting christianity among the Jews should be a trustee of the literary fund.”

Some amongst the most important duties of a government are not included amongst those enumerated by

Macaulay a few pages back ; thus, the provision of sound education (a duty second to none other in importance) is not mentioned. . . . the duty of the government, as a personality, to afford an example * to the governed is not specified. Nevertheless, of " some of the duties of a government " four are specified, and of those four " the security of persons and property " is but one. How is it that, in the foregoing remarks, Macaulay assumes that the duties of government consist wholly and solely in providing for the security of persons and property ? " It will hardly be denied that the security of the persons and property of men is a good object, and that the best way, indeed the only way, of promoting that object, is to combine men together in certain great corporations called states." Such associations of men merely for the protection of life and property are not unknown in some countries, they are called, however, not states, but committees of safety, or by some such title.

Macaulay proceeds to express a decided opinion upon the subject of argument : " We should say that those great corporations would, like all other associations, be likely to attain their end most perfectly if that end were kept singly in view." Which, taken in conjunction with what follows it, must be understood to mean that those great corporations called states ought to have nothing to do with religion, and that persons might be well qualified to take part in the government albeit they had no religious belief whatever, nor professed to have any.

To this opinion we, for ourselves, oppose a decidedly opposite opinion :—We say that it is essentially the business of states to have to do with religion, and that the persons alluded to would not be reasonably qualified to take part in the government of the country. We should

* An example of respect to the law,....of attention to religious duties,....of firmness and strict regard to honour.....of tolerance and temperance.....of charity,.....and of honesty in the strictest sense.

have no confidence whatever in the loyalty of such persons either to the head of the government or to the nation ; we think, moreover, they would inevitably bring the State into trouble. The quotations from the Essay, which Macaulay has put before the reader, make it appear that Mr. Gladstone's opinion was much the same as we have expressed for ourselves. We do not suppose that the repeated statement or reiteration of these opinions, merely as opinions, can reasonably help the argument much, but if repeatedly expressed on the one side, it is as well that they should be similarly opposed on the other.

THE REVIEW :—(15) “It is impossible to name any collection of human beings to which Mr. Gladstone's reasonings would apply more strongly than to an army. Where shall we find more complete unity of action than in an army ? Where else do so many human beings implicitly obey one ruling mind ? What other mass is there which moves so much like one man ? Where is such tremendous power intrusted to those who command ? Where is so awful a responsibility laid upon them ? If Mr. Gladstone has made, as he conceives, an imperative necessity for a State Religion, much more has he made it out to be imperatively necessary that every army should, in its collective capacity, profess a religion. Is he prepared to adopt this consequence ?

“On the morning of the thirteenth of August, in the year 1704, two great captains, equal in authority, united by close private and public ties, but of different creeds, prepared for a battle, on the event of which were staked the liberties of Europe. Marlborough had passed a part of the night in prayer, and before daybreak received the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England. He then hastened to join Eugene who had probably just confessed himself to a popish priest. The generals consulted together, formed their plans in concert, and repaired each to his own post. Marlborough gave

orders for public prayers. The English chaplains read the service at the head of the English regiments. The Calvinistic chaplains of the Dutch army, with heads on which hand of Bishop had never been laid, poured forth their supplications in front of their countrymen. In the meantime, the Danes might listen to their lutheran ministers; and Capuchins might encourage the Austrian squadrons, and pray to the Virgin for a blessing on the arms of the Holy Roman Empire. The battle commences. These men of various religions all act like members of one body. The Catholic and the Protestant generals exert themselves to assist and to surpass each other. Before sunset the Empire is saved: France has lost in a day the fruits of eighty years of intrigue and of victory: and the allies, after conquering together, return thanks to God separately, each after his own form of worship. Now is this practical atheism? Would any man in his senses say, that, because the allied army had unity of action and a common interest, and because a heavy responsibility lay on its chiefs, it was, therefore, imperatively necessary that the army should, as an army, have one established religion, that Eugene should be deprived of his command for being a Catholic, that all the Dutch and Austrian Colonels should be broken for not subscribing the thirty-nine Articles? Certainly not. The most ignorant grenadier on the field of battle would have seen the absurdity of such a proposition. 'I know,' he would have said, 'that the prince of Savoy goes to mass, and that our Corporal John cannot abide it; but what has the mass to do with the taking of the village of Blenheim? The prince wants to beat the French, and so does Corporal John. If we stand by each other we shall most likely beat them. If we send all the papists and Dutch away, Tallard will have every man of us.'

Mr. Gladstone himself, we imagine, would admit that our honest grenadier would have the best of the argument; and if so, what follows? Even this; that all

Mr. Gladstone's general principles about power, and responsibility, and personality, and conjoint action, must be given up, and that if his theory is to stand at all it must stand on some other foundation."

An example and illustration more distinctly adverse and more potently damaging to his own case, than that which is here put before the reader by Macaulay, could scarcely be desired by an opponent desirous to make the fallacy of that case clearly apparent. In reference to the first paragraph, we do not think that a more imperative necessity for a religious profession by an army than by a Government has been made out. We do not think the statements of Mr. Gladstone, quoted from the *Essay*, include such an assertion. We should, indeed, consider the army as the servant or instrument of the Executive Government, and the commanding officers of the army as a part of the Government. If therefore, it be established that it necessarily belongs to a good Government to have and profess religious truth, it follows that an army should have and profess religious truth; that it should have confidence in the justice of the cause it is to fight for, and it should recognize its dependence upon the the Source of life, the Giver of victory, the Supreme Arbiter, for strength, valour and success; and that it should give expression to such recognition by offering prayer and praise.

The astonishing characteristic of the example which follows the paragraph, as an example chosen by Macaulay, is that the advantage or necessity of 'the profession by an army of a religion' is therein most fully recognized and clearly exemplified. The generals, of the two armies, respectively pass the night previous to the battle in prayer, and at daybreak perform the most solemn religious rite; each according to the ceremonial provided by his church. Services are then read at the head of the regiments; prayers are offered on the field, in which all the soldiers in each of the united armies take part. accord-

ing to the respective formulas and ceremonials of their church. Then the battle takes place. "These men" who have their differences of opinion and belong to different religious systems, but who agree in professing religion and in expressing their religion in prayer "all act like members of one body." The Catholic and Protestant generals "exert themselves to assist and surpass each other." What is the result? A great victory. Having gained the victory, was that an end of their religious profession? Had it been merely a superstitious formal ceremony, or did the men (including the grenadier) who were, like other men, able to think for themselves, think that their prayers had been answered? Is there any evidence whether or not they thought it absurd to connect the fact of having gained the victory with the prayers they had offered? Macaulay himself answers this question; "the allies, after conquering together, return thanks to God each separately after his own form of worship." After thus answering the question with the utmost distinctness, Macaulay, without any contradicting evidence whatever to support the assumption, assumes that the men, who had prayed before the battle and returned thanks to God after the victory, really considered it absurd to suppose that their prayers and the victory had any reasonable connection. The grenadier who is supposed to see the absurdity of the supposition asks accordingly: "What has the mass to do with the taking of Blenheim?" To complete the singular inversion of reasoning exhibited in this section of the argument, Macaulay imagines that Mr. Gladstone himself will approve the opinion of the grenadier. We believe it would be, on the whole, very difficult to match the elaborate inconsequence of this part of Macaulay's essay written, as it is, with all the advantages of that literary art of which the distinguished historian was so great a master.

In the paragraph immediately succeeding this, Macaulay seems to be at cross purposes with Mr. Gladstone. The

latter has said, as we understand it, that in order to determine theoretically what the duties of a Government are, it is necessary to suppose a Government which has been made as nearly perfect as human knowledge will enable men to make it; in considering the application of the propositions, such an abstract Government, and not an existing actual Government, should be chosen. This Macaulay misunderstands, unless we are mistaken, as an assertion, on the part of Mr. Gladstone, that good Governments are perfect, and a demand that bad Governments shall be made good.

THE REVIEW continues:—(16) “ We do not, however, admit that, if a Government were, for all its temporal ends, as perfect as human frailty allows, such a Government would, therefore, be necessarily qualified to propagate true religion. For we see that the fitness of Governments to propagate true religion is by no means proportioned to their fitness for the temporal end of their institution. Looking at individuals, we see that the princes under whose rule nations have been most ably protected from foreign and domestic disturbance, and have made the most rapid advances in civilization, have been by no means good teachers of divinity.. Take, for example, the best French sovereign, Henry the Fourth, a king who restored order, terminated a terrible civil war, brought the finances into an excellent condition, made his country respected throughout Europe, and endeared himself to the great body of the people whom he ruled. Yet this man was twice a Huguenot, and twice a Papist. He was, as Davila hints, strongly suspected of having no religion at all, in theory, and was certainly not much under religious restraint, in his practice. Take the Czar Peter, the Empress Catherine, Frederick the Great. It will surely not be disputed that these sovereigns, with all their faults, were, if we consider them with reference merely to the temporal ends of Government, above the average of merit. Con-

sidered as theological guides, Mr. Gladstone would probably put them below the most abject drivellers of the Spanish branch of the house of Bourbon."

Here we find again the confusion of the religious system of a sect with true theology or religious truth ; and the confusion of political or temporal theology with spiritual theology. Macaulay's own estimate of the potentates he mentions is that, with all their faults, they were, if we consider them with reference merely to the temporal ends of Government, above the average of merit. But in so far as they were above the average of merit so were they more perfectly fulfilling their duty to the Supreme temporal Governor of the earth, and were, by their lives and conduct, practically exemplifying and teaching His rules. As teachers of spiritual theology it is very likely that they were none of them qualified, either by the necessary knowledge or by the desire to obtain that knowledge ; although in the case of Henry the Fourth, it seems by no means a safe but a very rash inference that because, under the circumstances which then obtained, he twice changed his membership from the religious system of the Huguenots to the Papal system, and "vice versa," he was therefore a bad teacher of theology. Evidently, however, Macaulay here loses sight of the question in controversy which is... whether a very good (abstract) government ought, as one of its duties and functions, to profess and practice religion ; Mr. Gladstone's Essay does not state that all monarchs or all Governments have so done, but argues and teaches that they should do so.

Macaulay brings under observation the recorded origins of various Governments which, according to history, consolidated their power and became more or less permanent.

THE REVIEW. (17) "A nation of barbarians pours down on a rich and unwarlike empire, enslaves the people, portions out the land, and blends the institutions which it finds in the cities with those which it has brought from the woods."

“A handful of daring adventurers from a civilized nation wanders to some savage country, and reduces the aboriginal race to bondage. A successful general turns his arms against the state which he serves. A society, made brutal by oppression, rises madly on its masters, sweeps away all old laws and usages, and when its first paroxysm of rage is over, sinks down passively under any form of polity, which may spring out of the chaos. A chief of a party, as at Florence, becomes imperceptibly a sovereign, and the founder of a dynasty. A captain of mercenaries, as at Milan, seizes on a city, and by the sword makes himself its ruler. An elective senate, as at Venice, usurps permanent and hereditary power.”

So that if we consider the terrestrial existence of human beings as an educational process, we have here evidence that the conditions surrounding that existence have in respect to the form of government been greatly varied, and that occasionally the form of a government has been changed by violence. Thus furnishing occasion for a fresh set of experiences. Macaulay proceeds to discuss the subject of persecution in, what he considers to be, its relation to the general subject of argument, but here again he has, it seems to us, confounded the unjustifiable and tyrannical enforcement, by persecution, of the opinions and prejudices of a set of human beings upon their fellow men, with the wholesome and necessary restraint, by punishment, from neglect of those rules and laws upon which the safety and well-being of states is dependent, which last is part of the especial duty of a government.

THE REVIEW :—(18) “If the relation in which government ought to stand to the people be, as Mr. Gladstone tells us, a paternal relation, we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that persecution is justifiable. For the right of propagating opinions by punishment is one which belongs to parents as clearly as the right to give instruction. A boy is compelled to attend family worship : he is forbid-

den to read irreligious books: if he will not learn his catechism, he is sent to bed without his supper: if he plays truant at church time, a task is set him. If he should display the precocity of his talents by expressing impious opinions before his brothers and sisters, we should not blame his father for cutting short the controversy with a horse-whip."

We have no doubt, that the relation of the *good* government to the subjects of that government is paternal; (*) and that the illustration furnished by Macaulay of the father correcting his son by the infliction of bodily suffering does apply to the judicial and necessary correction of the subject by the government. (†) If one is right, as Macaulay admits it to be, why not the other? . . . Where is the essential difference between them? A boy is prevented, by means of punishment on the part of his father, from injuring his brothers and sisters by the expression of impious opinions. This is right. Why, then, is it not right for a man to be prevented, by punishment on the part of a government, from injuring his fellow subjects in a similar manner?

A boy is forbidden to read irreligious books, and is compelled to attend family worship. Granting that this is right and proper on the part of the father towards the boy, wherefore is a similar course of conduct on the part of the government towards the man (the governed) under its guardianship and care, wrong? If a boy will not learn his catechism he is sent to bed without supper. . . This compulsory education is quite approved in respect

(*) The relation of a *good* government as a personality, to the governed as a personality, includes the relation of the more highly developed intelligence to the less highly developed, of the better educated to the less educated, of wisdom acquired by the training of study and experience to the comparative simplicity and ignorance of the untrained; a relationship essentially similar to that of the man to the boy.

(†) It is quite true that a government is not justified in exercising tyrannical restraint and punishment on the governed; but, what Macaulay fails to observe is that, the parent is also not justified in the exercise of unnecessary restraint and punishment on his boy.

to the boy, but is considered to have no reasonable application to the case of the man.

THE REVIEW :—(19) All the reasons which lead us to think that parents are peculiarly fitted to conduct the education of their children, and that the education is the principal end of a parental relation, lead us also to think that parents ought to be allowed to use punishment if necessary, for the purpose of forcing children, who are incapable of judging for themselves, to receive religious instruction and to attend religious service. Why, then, is this prerogative of punishment, so eminently paternal, to be withheld from a paternal government ? ”

To which the only reasonable answer appears to be... Why ? The inconsequential conclusion, which Macaulay again arrives at, is here occasioned, as before, by confounding mere conjectures, undemonstrated opinions, and uncertain judgments, which may be sound or unsound, with that certain and assured knowledge which is established as true.

The Reviewer enquires . . . (20) “ What reason can be given for hanging a murderer, and suffering a heresiarch to escape without even a pecuniary mulct ? Is the heresiarch a less pernicious member of society than the murderer ? Is not the loss of one soul a greater evil than the loss of many lives ? And the number of murders committed by the most profligate bravo that ever let out his poniard to hire in Italy, or by the most savage buccaneer that ever prowled on the windward station, is small indeed, when compared with the number of souls which have been caught in the meshes of the dexterous heresiarch. If, then, the heresiarch causes infinitely greater evils than the murderer, why is he not as proper an object of penal legislation as the murderer ? We can give a reason, a reason short, simple, decisive and consistent. We do not extenuate the evil which the heresiarch produces : but we say that it is not evil of that sort against which it is the end of government to guard.

But how Mr. Gladstone, who considers the evil which the heresiarch produces as evil of the sort against which it is the end of government to guard, can escape from the obvious consequences of his doctrine, we do not understand."

But what if the teaching of the heresiarch be such that it will, by its effects, jeopardize the lives and property of his fellow subjects? To guard the lives and property of the governed, is expressly stated by Macaulay in one place to be one of the ends of civil government, and in another place to be the sole end of government... and yet, here is a man openly putting in jeopardy those lives and property, and the government is to look on with folded hands and not venture to interfere. What is a heresiarch? A man who teaches heresy. Yes, but what is heresy? Macaulay fails to observe that, in this question is contained the difficulty. No reason, in our judgment, has been given, nor do we suppose that any can be given, why a just and good government is not to consider itself bound to restrain by punishment and othersuitable means of prevention *an actual heresiarch*; but there are very grave reasons indeed why a human government should not constitute itself, in the first place, the judge of unsettled controversial questions of great difficulty and then proceed, on its own judgment, to pronounce some particular teacher a heresiarch, and to subject him thereupon to persecution. In so doing the government would contravene that Divine Law, which forbids any human being to impose by force or fraud his unapproved judgment upon his fellow-man. In acting in such a manner the government might be, not improbably, restraining the so-called heresiarch from teaching the truth and be thus impeding, instead of assisting, the progress of sound theology. This is very clearly stated by Mr. Gladstone as quoted by the Reviewer.—(21.)

"We, as fallible creatures, says Mr. Gladstone, have no right, from any bare speculations of our own, to administer

pains and penalties to our fellow creatures, whether on social or religious grounds. We have the right to enforce the laws of the land by such pains and penalties, because it is expressly given by Him who has declared that the civil rulers are to bear the sword for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the encouragement of them that do well. And so, in things spiritual, had it pleased God to give to the Church or the State this power, to be permanently exercised over their members, or mankind at large, we should have the right to use it; but it does not appear to have been so received, and, consequently, it should not be exercised."

Because the civil rulers are to bear the sword for the punishment of *evil-doers*, and for the encouragement of them that do *well*; therefore the laws of the land, if they be just laws, are based upon and are applications of that knowledge which is established as approved and sound. When this is understood it becomes apparent that the just civil laws are, if not primarily then secondarily, belonging to religious truth.* The question then becomes, how much of established religious truth in any given country is included in and with the civil laws? Whether all the religious truth is included which can be and which, being established, ought to be included.

Macaulay proceeds to charge Mr. Gladstone with teaching in his Essay that it is the duty of the British Government to exclude Protestant dissenters and those of his fellow subjects professing the Roman Catholic system from any share in the government of the nation. In the quotations before us from the Essay we find nothing to sustain or support such a charge; seeing how frequently and entirely Macaulay has mistaken the meaning conveyed in those portions of the Essay which he has quoted, it is not too much to suppose that this

* It may be said that much civil law is of human arrangement; but, if the laws be certainly just and true, this is merely saying that they are divine in a secondary degree; because, if just and true, they must be derived from Him upon whose justice and truth they are based.

charge may be founded more or less upon similar misunderstanding. For ourselves, we have not the Essay itself before us, neither are we desirous in this connection to consult it, or to refer directly to it. The particular question for consideration (namely the charge), here brought forward, is upon an actual case having locality and vitality, belonging to an existing nation and surrounded therefore with particular national conditions; here, therefore, is an element, belonging certainly to reason but not to abstract reasoning, which may interfere with and determine the reasonable decision. We say that, in the reasonable decision of any such national question, National Expediency must be allowed its due weight, that is, allowed to exercise its appointed and salutary influence. A decided opinion on the particular abstract case, here immediately involved, is included in the positive opinions on the more general abstract case which we have already put before the reader, and can be readily given. The differences of opinion between the Anglican Evangelical Church, Protestant dissenters or Non-conformists, and Roman Catholics are not of such a kind that those belonging to the one religious system have any abstract right, founded upon Divine Law or reason, to exclude those belonging to either of the other systems from taking an active part in the government. Not having primarily such abstract right they cannot become possessed of an exclusive right as inherent in themselves, in their doctrines or system; but expediency may determine the nation to confer such right upon them to hold and to exercise for the nation, and such right may be secured to them by the nation, in the interests and for the welfare and security of the nation.

Those who read on to the end of the Review will find that the determining influence of national expediency in deciding a question of this kind is recognized by Maylay to the fullest extent. With his final judgment on

this particular case, decided as it is by considerations of national expediency, we in a great measure concur. The statement of his decision, however, is preceded by Macaulay's own estimate of the merits and demerits of the Anglican Evangelical Church, and, as that estimate belongs to the final decision, we will put before the reader the whole of his conclusion on this particular case in his own words, accompanied with observations of our own in answer to certain passages of the estimate from which we strongly dissent.

THE REVIEW:—(22) “On these principles we conceive that a statesman, who might be far indeed from regarding the Church of England with the reverence which Mr. Gladstone feels for her, might yet firmly oppose all attempts to destroy her. Such a statesman may be too well acquainted with her origin to look upon her with superstitious awe. He may know that she sprang from a compromise huddled up between the eager zeal of reformers and the selfishness of greedy, ambitious and time-serving politicians.”

Now this is untrue; and it is difficult to help condemning it as untrue in the worst sense: it is very difficult to assume that when Macaulay wrote this he did not know what he was writing to be untrue. . . . Leaving the strictly religious nature of the subject for the moment aside, the statement is not creditable to Macaulay as a man of letters, as a man of ability and industry, as a historian. It is not true in fact that she sprang from a compromise huddled up; on the contrary, her foundations were laid with calm deliberation, with patient study, with earnest devotion to the great work entrusted them, by men of learning and of great ability, by men eager and zealous no doubt, but who understood how to combine eagerness with patience and to temper zeal with moderation. It is probable there are many highly educated men, well qualified to judge, who consider the church of England the grandest institution of modern times.

There can be but few disposed to deny that she is, at least, one of the greatest of modern institutions. And are the men who assisted to lay the foundations of this noble edifice. . . who helped to plant and nourish the young tree which has since spread its branches far and wide, and borne so much goodly fruit. . . are Clarendon, Chillingworth, Hooker, Stillingfleet, Cudworth, Taylor, and their worthy coadjutors and fellow labourers, to be consigned to oblivion as men whose eager zeal was content to huddle up a compromise with greedy time-serving politicians? . . . as men who deserve no remembrance and gratitude, no praise and reverence from those who now enjoy in security and peace the full benefits of the work which they accomplished amidst anxiety, danger and excitement?

THE REVIEW :—"He may find in every page of her annals ample cause for censure."

But where are the annals in every page of which he may not find cause for censure yet more ample? What was that human institution, if so be its existence was a living, active, developing existence, of which the true annals, if scrutinized with a severely censorious eye, will not afford in every page ample cause for censure? Does not every portion of every single human life furnish cause for censure? . . . How then can a living institution, the life of which is compounded of the lives of individuals, be free from cause of censure?

THE REVIEW :—"He may feel that he could not, with ease to his conscience, subscribe all her articles."

Great numbers of good men and true have subscribed her articles; surely it is very hard to suppose that the consciences of those men who have, were less strict on an average than the consciences of those who have not so subscribed. We are not disposed to allow that the men who have subscribed were, man for man, less honest, less loyal, sincere and true, than the men who have not. But which church or what individual has succeeded in fram-

ing articles of faith which every one can subscribe with an easy conscience? Is any one able to draw up articles on a subject other than that of religion, on political economy, for instance, on legal administration, or on national finance, . . . articles setting forth positive opinions or absolute beliefs, on a number of difficult questions relating to either of those general subjects, such that, of a great number of persons, each can honestly subscribe them all as true and precise statements of his own individual convictions on each and all of those questions?

THE REVIEW.—“He may regret that all the attempts which have been made to open her gates to large classes of non-conformists should have failed.”

He may rejoice that her frontiers extend far and wide, and that she can accommodate so great a multitude of honest and zealous men, with their differences of opinion on matters of minor importance, within her territory. He may rejoice that there is room within for all who wish to enter; that her gates are wide; and that those within are ready to welcome those without.

THE REVIEW:—“Her episcopal policy he may consider as of purely human institution. He cannot defend her on the ground that she possesses the apostolical succession: for he does not know whether that succession may not be altogether a fable.”

He may examine her prayer book, and finding therein reliable evidence of direct inspiration, he may conclude that the continuity of apostolical succession prior to the time of the prayer book is not a matter of any particular importance. He would, we say, reasonably conclude that the distinct approval or re-institution of a church by the Supreme Head at any particular time suffices to remove all uneasiness as to irregularities which might have taken place prior to that time.

THE REVIEW:—“He cannot defend her on the ground of her unity; for he knows that her frontier sects are

much more remote from each other, than one frontier is from the Church of Rome, or the other from the Church of Geneva. But he may think that she teaches more truth with less alloy of error than would be taught by those who, if she were swept away, would occupy the vacant space. He may think that the effect produced by her beautiful services and by her pulpits on the national mind, is, on the whole, highly beneficial. He may think that her civilizing influence is usefully felt in remote districts. He may think that, if she were destroyed, a large portion of those who now compose her congregations would neglect all religious duties, and that a still larger portion would fall under the influence of spiritual mountebanks, hungry for gain, or drunk with fanaticism. While he would with pleasure admit that all the qualities of Christian pastors are to be found in large measure within the existing body of dissenting ministers, he would perhaps be inclined to think that the standard of intellectual and moral character among that exemplary class of men may have been raised to its present high point and maintained there by the indirect influence of the establishment. And he may be by no means satisfied that, if the Church were at once swept away, the place of our Sumners and Whateleys would be supplied by Doddridges and Halls. He may think that the advantages we have described are obtained, or might, if the existing system were slightly modified, be obtained, without any sacrifice of the paramount objects which all governments ought to have chiefly in view. Nay, he may be of opinion that an institution, so deeply fixed in the hearts and minds of millions, could not be subverted without loosening and shaking all the foundations of civil society."

To continue the analytical examination of this Review further than we have now done would not, we think, answer any useful purpose; it would be like playing an argument with variations, merely to examine propositions substantially the same as those already disposed of,

and to repeat over again the objections already before the reader.

A question, which, as the reader will probably have perceived, lies at the very foundation of the fundamental propositions which form the basis of our argument, is whether there be, or be not, demonstrable evidence of the frequent or constant interposition of spiritual interference in the temporal affairs of men. It seems to us that, in passages of several of Macaulay's Essays but more especially throughout that review of which we have been now engaged in the examination, there are indications of mental dissatisfaction on that question.

If we are right in such supposition, the signs by which it may be recognized are unreasonableness, impatience, want of clearness in apprehension of sequence, and of definition in statement. This would be the psychological condition of a man in relation to a question upon which his mind had hastily accepted a conclusion which he afterwards felt that his reason disapproved, but which, having once accepted, he refused to give up.

A general examination of such a question to be satisfactory would evidently require much space, but, we think, seeing its close connection to the propositions we have been now considering, that a brief examination of this question may serve a useful purpose by bringing the whole subject more completely under the consideration of the reader.

We shall not be particular about putting this collateral argument in a strictly formal shape. As a general basis we will assume the truth and the supernatural character of the miracles recorded in the Bible; and, which is inseparable from such assumption, the evidence of supernatural interposition furnished in the Bible itself (*i.e.* in the existence of the Bible and the peculiar characteristics of that Book, taken together with the condi-

tions and circumstances attaching to it). We are strongly of opinion that this basis will be found acceptable to a great number, probably to a great majority, of those persons, even, who have not a distinct spiritual belief in the Bible, and have not a distinct or a reasonable belief in a real actual spiritual universe. Such persons would assert a general belief in the Bible and of the miracles therein recorded as manifestations of supernatural power which actually took place, instances therefore of spiritual interference with the physical laws of nature; but here those persons would stop. Their belief, such as it is, of the circumstances just mentioned includes a belief that those circumstances were exceptional, and they are content, for the most part, to put them mentally by themselves as not admitting of reasonable explanation. As for any spiritual manifestations independent of those recorded in the Bible, or as having happened since the time of the apostles, they do not believe in them at all. . . . No.

The laws of Nature are constant, definite, certain, and unvarying. . . the accumulated observations of trained and careful observers have quite decided that they are so. Supposed exceptions cannot bear the close investigations of modern science . . . people are superstitious and easily deceived, but the great moral and physical laws of universal Nature are immutable and eternal. Men exist as men under the conditions determined and secured by the constant operation of these unvarying laws. For the rest, they are dependent upon themselves; as individuals, indeed, they are in some measure dependent upon chance or fortune, but as communities or associations they are dependent upon themselves; for their prosperity, for their comfort, security, civilization and general well-being they are dependent upon themselves and upon each other.

This is substantially the belief, some parts of it directly and some parts of it indirectly or negatively, but on the whole, quite distinctly stated, of Macaulay. It is,

we think, also, substantially the belief of a great number of educated persons, at the present time. In adopting this as a fundamental belief, most persons would readily allow that it is not absolutely fundamental in a strict sense ; but, they would say, it goes as far back as we can get with any certainty. Every thing that we can get at, examine and investigate, harmonizes with, strengthens, confirms and establishes this belief. It is an assumption certainly ; its truth is not absolutely established because all the evidence cannot be got at, but it is probable in such a degree and with such a force of probability that it may be considered equivalent to demonstrated truth.

For ourselves, we opine that on the ground of reasonable probability such a fundamental belief cannot stand, and we think that the mental dissatisfaction, which to us is apparent in some of Macaulay's writings, is attributable to his wilfully retaining a belief which he felt to be unsound.

A preliminary general examination of the BELIEF IN NATURE, AS A FUNDAMENTAL BELIEF.

In the first place, the putting the Bible by itself as a collection of mysterious facts, is not satisfactory in a reasonable sense ; it is so far from satisfactory that, when steadily considered, it necessitates a misgiving as to the foundation of the collective belief. The Bible must be essentially true or must be untrue ; if it be certainly true, then, the narrative part of the Bible which relates in plain and unmistakeable language that certain occurrences took place, at times and places also distinctly and circumstantially stated, must be true ; it must be true that, in fact, the events recorded in the Bible-narrative actually occurred. But if this be admitted, a number of instances of spiritual interference with the laws of nature and with the temporal affairs of men is incontrovertibly established. As a consequent it must be admitted that, such interferences having taken place, they may take

place again. It is quite true that a long time has elapsed since the occurrences narrated in the Bible actually took place, and this circumstance, taken by itself, would give support to a supposition that such interferences were very unfrequent and quite exceptional. But exceptional interferences are neither included or allowed in the belief we are considering; and then, there are the other parts of the Bible, which are so connected with the narrative that the one part cannot be accepted alone, and the other part rejected as untrue. Of those other parts of the Bible the precise meaning is not nearly so plain and immediately evident as that of the narrative part, yet it is quite certain they contain repeated assertions, of the most decided character, that not only such spiritual interferences have frequently taken place in times past and will again take place in the future, but also that they are frequently and indeed constantly taking place. Hence a reasonable necessity becomes apparent for doing one of two things, either the Bible must be rejected or else the fundamental belief in Nature must be greatly modified and altered. The regulation and control of men's temporal affairs must be held to be subject to spiritual regulation and control, and even physical and mental laws of nature must be admitted to be subject to constant spiritual interference and control, or, otherwise, the Bible as to its divine origin and as containing unquestionable truth must be rejected. Now there are a great number of persons who do not like either of these alternatives; they do not like to altogether reject the Bible nor do they like to give up the self-existent laws of nature as the fundamental basis of their belief.

There is a prevalent doctrine on the subject of belief, of the taking or holding a belief as a psychological operation or action of the mind, which requires particular notice. According to this doctrine, which, although clearly the reverse of reasonable, appears to be now held almost universally, a person's acceptance

or rejection of a belief is to be determined by his wilful choice; he likes it, perhaps, because it is a comprehensive and liberal belief and he accepts it as his belief; or, he dislikes it because it is, in his opinion, a bigoted and superstitious belief, and therefore he rejects it. According to this doctrine, moreover, a person is praiseworthy and meritorious because he has taken and holds a good belief, or he is deserving of censure and punishment because he has taken and holds a bad belief. This means that a man may either accept or reject a set of opinions as a belief because he chooses to do so. This doctrine is false and plausible; and, being false and plausible, it is delusive and dangerous.

A man may not wilfully accept or reject a set of opinions as a belief; if he do so, he disobeys a primary and most imperative command of the Creator. Strictly speaking he cannot in such a manner obtain a sound belief; he may obtain a judgment or conclusion, taking that place in his mind which ought to be occupied by the belief, but it is never a sound and perfectly assured conviction.

A consequent of a person entertaining the doctrine that he may believe or disbelieve what he chooses, is the application of that doctrine also to *the part* of a set of opinions. When a person who holds the doctrine that belief or disbelief is a matter on which he may exercise his personal choice, is required by his reason to give up the Bible if it be untrue, or to accept the Bible if it be true and to give up the self-existent laws of nature, he is very likely to conclude the matter, as he considers, by a sort of compromise; giving up neither of those beliefs; not distinctly admitting to himself that they are irreconcilable and incapable of combining, but retaining the Bible as an extraordinary, and the self-existent laws as an ordinary belief. A mind which thus acts may be said to adopt for the object of its worship the God of unreason; the consequence is a loss of peace, of internal satisfaction,

of mental security ; a feeling that he has ultimately no absolute, self-sufficient, perfect reality to rest upon ; a feeling therefore of uncertainty and distrust.

What we propose now to do, is briefly to examine some of the historical evidence as to spiritual interference with the temporal affairs of men. We wish to make the examination in company with Macaulay, and to look at the subject, as nearly as possible, from his stand-point. But, if we tell him, in the first instance, decisively, that his fundamental belief is unreasonable and such as we cannot receive, he will at once conclude that we are possessed of passion and prejudice, and thereby incapacitated from seeing the merits of the subject as they present themselves to the dispassionate mind. Let us therefore take his theoretical belief along with us, together with our own, and see, when both are placed in the light of historical evidence, which of them, standing prominently forth, will become shining and visible, and which, hiding itself in the obscurity of darkness, will disappear and be no more seen.

Macaulay himself, in his Review of Ranke's History of the Popes, narrates the story of the long-continued struggle between two great intellectual nations . . . , between the Protestant and Papal systems of Christianity.

NATIONAL THEOLOGY.

From Macaulay's review of " Ranke's History of the Popes."

" We will attempt to lay before our reader, in a short compass, what appears to us to be the real history of the contest which began with the preaching of Luther against the Indulgences, and which may, in one sense, be said to have been terminated, a hundred and thirty years later, by the treaty of Westphalia."

Thus commences the narrative. But that narrative, as will appear, is by no means confined to the record or history of the events and transactions belonging to that interesting period. Unfortunately Macaulay has thought it desira-

ble to intermingle with it conjectures, theories, opinions and explanations of his own. The effect of this is that, from the very commencement, the reader has dust thrown in his eyes at the same time that the recorded facts are presented to his mental vision ; the ultimate consequence is, that, although the great lesson taught by the history of the long-continued struggle does not become in Macaulay's picture quite invisible, it does not stand out from his canvas with that distinctness and vividness which, from its educational importance and interest, it is most desirable that it should do.

“ In the northern parts of Europe the victory of Protestantism was rapid and decisive.”

This is doubtless in accordance with the evidence of history.

“ The dominion of the papacy was felt by the nations of Teutonic blood as the dominion of Italians, of foreigners, of men who were aliens in language, manners, and intellectual constitution.

“ The large jurisdiction exercised by the spiritual tribunals of Rome, seemed to be a degrading badge of servitude. The sums which, under a thousand pretexts were exacted by a distant court, were regarded both as a humiliating and as a ruinous tribute. The character of that court excited the scorn and disgust of a grave, earnest, sincere and devout people.”

That a few Germans here and there may have entertained sentiments of dislike to the ecclesiastical supremacy of Rome because causing a feeling on their part of inferiority and servitude to a foreign power, is not improbable... that a considerable number, not only of devout and thoughtful people, but, also, of persons who were merely intelligent enough to appreciate in a very ordinary degree the advantages of morality and sincerity, looked upon the vicious and degraded character, which at that time belonged to the papal court, with scorn and disgust, is quite probable. Nevertheless, having regard to the relation in which they are put forward... namely,

as related to the great change which took place immediately afterward, as antecedent and consequent; and as affording a comprehensive explanation of that sudden awakening from death-like torpor to active and energetic moral life of vast multitudes of minds. . the conjectures which Macaulay has here proffered may be pronounced quite insufficient and to be unsupported by the recorded facts.

What are, briefly stated, those recorded facts? That one man, not a man influential by position and wealth but a humble ecclesiastic quite destitute of wealth and known only to a few persons, makes a stand, denounces the unrighteous proceedings of his superiors, and refuses to be made a party to those proceedings; . . he appeals in the first place to 'reason,' and, then, directed and authorized by reason... appeals to the supreme temporal Governor of the Earth for support and assistance. What follows? Threatenings and danger opposed by firmness and reliance. . . . The most refined sophistry of the trained and practised casuists overcome by the plain reasoning of the almost inexperienced monk. . The practical sagacity of statesmen and politicians turned to foolishness. Treachery and violence defeated and prevented. . Each attempt to alarm and weaken him and to destroy his influence made the means of encouraging and strengthening him and of increasing his influence. . . . and, meantime, the light of reason breaks through the surrounding darkness, men begin to see, at first, very dimly; then, more clearly. Trust in God, truth, reason, morality, honesty, sincerity, are, it is soon perceived, all on the side of the humble and despised monk. The first great victory is won. Then—"The new theology spread with a rapidity never known before. All ranks, all varieties of character, joined the ranks of the innovators."

"Within fifty years from the day in which Luther publicly renounced communion with the papacy, and burned the bull of Leo before the gates of Wittenberg,"

“Protestantism attained its highest ascendancy, an ascendancy which it soon lost, and which it has never regained. Hundreds, who could well remember Brother Martin a devout Catholic, lived to see the revolution of which he was the chief author, victorious in half the States of Europe. In England, Scotland, Denmark, Sweden, Livonia, Prussia, Saxony, Hesse, Wurtemberg, the Palatinate, in several cantons in Switzerland, in the Northern Netherlands, the Reformation had completely triumphed; and in all other countries on this side of the Alps and the Pyrenees, it seemed on the point of triumphing.”

Macaulay puts before the reader a number of conjectures and arguments to account for the protestant system not having subverted and taken the place of the papal, in Italy and Spain, as it had done in the more northern countries. As explanations these conjectures are, like those preceding them, fanciful. To us, it seems evident that the considerations, which, according to Macaulay, prevented Italy and Spain from breaking the chain which bound them to Rome could only have influenced a comparatively very few persons in either of those countries. Supposing there had been the same readiness of response to the voice of reason, the same earnest longing for reasonable liberty, and that the same intellectual awakening of the minds of the educated population of those countries had taken place as in the north, those considerations which he speaks of as so influential would have gone for nothing. These conjectures of his are, however, shown to be fanciful and to have no actual support, by the circumstance of the reformation which, at that same time, actually took place in those countries and throughout the papal system, and of which the outward manifestations are described by Macaulay himself, as follows:—

“It is not, therefore, strange that the effect of the great outbreak of protestantism in one part of Christen-”

“dom should have been to produce an equally violent outbreak of Catholic zeal in another. Two reformations were pushed on at once with equal energy and effect, a reformation of doctrine in the north, a reformation of manners and discipline in the south. In the course of a single generation, the whole spirit of the Church of Rome underwent a change. From the halls of the Vatican to the most secluded hermitage of the Apennines, the great revival was everywhere felt and seen. All the institutions anciently devised for the propagation and defence of the faith were furnished up and made efficient.

Fresh engines of still more formidable power were constructed. Everywhere old religious communities were remodelled and new religious communities called into existence. Within a year after the death of Leo, the order of Camaldoli was purified; the Capuchins restored the old Franciscan discipline — the midnight prayer and the life of silence; the Barnabites and the society of Somasca devoted themselves to the relief and education of the poor. To the Theatine order a still higher interest belongs. Its great object was the same with that of our early Methodists, namely to supply the deficiencies of the parochial clergy. The Church of Rome, wiser than the Church of England, gave every countenance to the good work. The members of the new brotherhood preached to great multitudes in the streets and in the fields, prayed by the beds of the sick, and administered the last sacraments to the dying. Foremost amongst them in zeal and devotion was Gian Pietro Caraffa, afterwards Pope Paul the Fourth. In the convent of the Theatines at Venice, under the eye of Caraffa, a Spanish gentleman took up his abode, tended the poor in the hospitals, went about in rags, starved himself almost to death, and often sallied into the streets, mounted on stones, and, waving his hat to invite the passers by, began to preach in a strange jargon of Castilian and Tuscan.”

“The Theatines were among the most zealous and rigid of men; but, to this enthusiastic neophyte their discipline seemed lax, and their movements sluggish; for his own mind, naturally passionate and imaginative, had passed through a training which had given to all its peculiarities a morbid intensity and energy. In his early life he had been the very prototype of the hero of Cervantes. The single study of the young Hidalgo had been chivalrous romance; and his existence had been one gorgeous day-dream of princesses rescued and infidels subdued. . . . He had chosen a Dulcinea ‘no countess’, ‘no duchess’—these are his own words—‘but one of far higher station;’ and he flattered himself with the hope of laying at her feet the keys of Moorish castles and the jewelled turbans of Asiatic kings. In the midst of these visions of martial glory and prosperous love, a severe wound stretched him on a bed of sickness. His constitution was shattered and he was doomed to be a cripple for life. The palm of strength, grace, and skill in knightly exercises, was no longer for him. He could no longer hope to strike down gigantic soldans, or to find favour in the sight of beautiful women. A new vision then arose in his mind, and mingled itself with his old delusions in a manner which, to most Englishmen, must seem singular, but which those who know how close was the union between religion and chivalry in Spain will be at no loss to understand. He would still be a soldier; he would still be a knight-errant; but the soldier and knight-errant of the spouse of Christ. He would smite the great Red Dragon. He would be the champion of the woman clothed with the Sun. He would break the charm under which false prophets held the souls of men in bondage. His restless spirit led him to the Syrian deserts, and to the chapel of the Holy Sepulchre. Thence he wandered back to the farthest west, and astonished the convents of Spain and the schools of France by his penance and vigils. The same lively imagination”

“which had been employed in picturing the tumult of unreal battle, and the charms of unreal queens, now peopled his solitude with saints and angels. The Holy Virgin descended to commune with him. He saw the Saviour face to face with the eye of flesh. Even those mysteries of religion which are the hardest trial of faith were in his case palpable to sight. It is difficult to relate without a pitying smile that, in the sacrifice of the mass, he saw transubstantiation take place, and that, as he stood praying on the steps of the Church of St. Dominic, he saw the Trinity in Unity, and wept aloud with joy and wonder. Such was the celebrated Ignatius Loyola, who, in the great Catholic reaction, bore the same part which Luther bore in the great Protestant movement.”

Chivalry meets with, on the part of Macaulay, a disdainful cold approval, as of a semi-barbarous institution which had served a useful purpose in the semi-barbarous age to which it belonged ;—the semi-barbarous institution of a semi-barbarous age which the civilization of his own had left far, far behind.

And yet, Macaulay himself belonged to the order of chivalry. To him, . . . a knight, belonging to the order of chivalry, was a man in armour on a horse ; a man whose good intentions and ignorance, whose romantic ideas and reliance on brute force, suggested to the cultivated mind of the sage of the nineteenth century, an individual associated more or less closely with the grotesque and the ludicrous.

And yet Macaulay was himself a knight. It was as a knight that he merited and won the applause, admiration and gratitude, of his fellow country-men, and of the educated public of Christendom—gratitude and homage rendered to him because he was a knight, and because he was recognized by them to be so. But there were degrees in chivalry, and amongst the knights may be expressly distinguished three classes : the first, the second and the highest. Of the first was the knight or knight-errant,

who trusted mainly in his own individual prowess and the skilful use of his weapons to overcome his adversaries. It is true he was sworn to defend virtue, purity and faith, to protect the weak and oppressed, and to do battle with vice, treachery and crime, and he would endeavour to faithfully fulfil the conditions of his oath as he understood them; but his trust was mainly in his sinews and muscle, in his own courage and practised eye; his adversary was likely to be any one who opposed him; and his favourite exploits were such as he could himself accomplish unaided; combats in which the victory and renown belonged to himself alone. Such were of the first class, and such very many of that class remained all their lives; some, however, understood even as young men, and as they gained in experience, got to understand more clearly that brute force in a man should be controlled and directed by the mind—that the strength of one individual alone could accomplish but very little—that to distinguish between vice and virtue, morality and immorality, and right and wrong, knowledge and mental training were requisite, therefore education and industry became necessary—casuistry must be met by honest argument, false teaching by true; and that the combined strength of the vicious and false, of the deceivers and oppressors, could only be successfully opposed and overcome by the combined strength of those who were pledged and determined to resist them to the utmost—To the second class, and undoubtedly to high rank in the second class, belonged Macaulay. But there were some few who learned to understand more than this; who learned the inner and fuller meaning of chivalry;—who got to know that the combat with evil in all its forms must be commenced and accomplished by the individual within himself,—who learned the great lesson—to realize that the serious contest was spiritual, that he was himself capable of becoming spiritual and fighting as a spirit; that the arms

of the flesh were but the arms of children with which to practise, in order to educate and prepare himself for the warfare and work of the intellectual man; who learned to understand that very many of the visible obstacles, difficulties and apparent evils of his bodily existence were there in order that by opposing, surmounting and overcoming them he might become fitted to contend with and triumph over those more real and potent evils which as a spiritual being, he would have to encounter in mortal combat; who got to understand the meaning of sacrifice and of self sacrifice, that selfishness and sensuality belonged to the lower nature, and that the lower nature must be despised and sacrificed whenever its interests were opposed to those of the higher, that the inclinations, desires and passions of the individual must be controlled and brought into subjection, and that, to accomplish this, the passions and desires of the lower nature must be first combated with and subdued;... who at last comprehended and learned to fully understand that the highest of all knightly duties was perfect submission to the Will of the Supreme Head of the order. Of that highest class one of the most distinguished was that Ignatius whom Macaulay is now describing—that Ignatius in whom the knighthood of chivalrous Spain, once the champion of Christendom, culminated—Ignatius Loyola the Great.

“Dissatisfied with the system of the Theatines, the enthusiastic Spaniard turned his face towards Rome, poor, obscure, without a patron, without recommendations, he entered the city where now two princely temples, rich with painting and many-coloured marble, commemorate his great services to the Church; where his form stands sculptured in massive silver; where his bones, enshrined amidst jewels, are placed beneath the altar of God His activity and zeal bore down all opposition, and under his rule the order of Jesuits began, and grew rapidly to the full measure of his gigantic powers. With”

“what vehemence, with what policy, with what exact discipline, with what dauntless courage, with what self-denial, with what forgetfulness of the dearest private ties, with what intense and stubborn devotion to a single end, with what unscrupulous laxity and versality in the choice of means, the Jesuits fought the battle of their church, is written in every page of the annals of Europe during several generations. In the order of Jesus was concentrated the quintessence of the catholic spirit ; and the history of the order of Jesus is the history of the great catholic reaction.” “It cannot be doubted that, since the sixteenth century, the protestant nations have made decidedly greater progress than their neighbours. The progress made by those nations in which Protestantism, though not finally successful, yet maintained a long struggle, and left permanent traces, has generally been considerable. But when we come to the catholic, and, to the part of Europe in which the first spark of reformation was trodden out as soon as it appeared, and from which proceeded the impulse which drove Protestantism back, we find, at best, a very slow progress, and, on the whole, a retrogression. Compare Denmark and Portugal. When Luther began to preach, the superiority of the Portuguese was unquestionable, at present the superiority of the Danes is no less so. Compare Edinburgh and Florence. Edinburgh has owed less to climate, soil, and to the fostering care of rulers than any capital, Protestant or Catholic—in all these respects Florence has been singularly happy ; yet whoever knows what Florence and Edinburgh were in the generation preceding the Reformation, and what they are now, will acknowledge that some great cause has, during the last three centuries, operated to raise one part of the European family, and to depress the other. Compare the history of England and that of Spain during the last century. In arms, arts, sciences, letters, commerce, agriculture, the contrast is striking. The”

“distinction is not confined to this side of the Atlantic. The colonies planted by England in America have immeasurably outgrown in power those planted by Spain; yet we have no reason to believe that, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Castilian was in any respect inferior to the Englishman. Our firm belief is that the North owes its great civilization and prosperity chiefly to the moral effect of the Protestant Reformation, and that the decay of the southern countries of Europe is to be mainly ascribed to the great Catholic revival ”

The supposition here last expressed certainly calls for explanation. The Catholic revival, as it is here termed, has been described as a great reformation; to vice, lawlessness and hypocrisy, succeeded, as a result of this great reform, virtue, sincerity and obedience to the law. Surely Macaulay cannot mean that such a change had for its consequent the decay of the nations which underwent that change. It is doubtless historically true that the reformation spoken of by Macaulay took place in respect to the Papal Court and, to some extent, throughout the Papal ecclesiastical administration. and that, besides an immediate reformation in morals and conduct, it had as its result a lasting increase in the general zeal and attention to duty of the priesthood. But the supposition of a great and permanent national reformation, throughout the nations which remained under the influence of the papal system, appears to be a somewhat hasty assumption of Macaulay's, not supported by the evidence of history.

We are engaged, first in the contemplation of the struggle for supremacy between two great religious systems, and, afterwards, in comparing the moral and political results of their respective influence on the several communities of men which became subject to the one or to the other. It is therefore desirable to consider with attention and to define with care the characteristic of the essential difference between them. That characteristic is . . . A distinct recognition, on the part of the

Protestant, of a personal Spiritual Governor, to Whom he is directly responsible ; by Whom he is directly influenced, governed and controlled ; to Whom personally he may and can apply for counsel, assistance, guidance and forgiveness ; and, Whom he is required to address personally in reasonable prayer. . . . and An indistinct recognition, on the part of the Roman-Catholic, of a Supreme Mystical Being, Whom he is to propitiate by offerings of material sacrifice, and by the performance of certain visible rites and ceremonies ; by Whom he is indirectly governed through the medium of certain human-beings, empowered and authorized to administer government, reward, and punishment on earth, as his vicegerents, agents or representatives. A Mystical and Dreadful Being, whom he, as an individual, must not venture to address personally and directly, but must do so through the mediation of certain human intercessors and mediators appointed or privileged to act in such capacity ; and whatever his spiritual needs may be, whether it be pardon, grace, spiritual or material help, which he may desire, it is through these agents, the human intercessors and mediators, that the Supreme Mystical Spirit must be approached, appeased, and addressed. This we believe to be a substantially correct definition of the characteristic difference between the Protestant and Roman-Catholic systems of Christianity.

In making this statement we are quite aware that there are diverse sub-systems of doctrine and many shades of individual belief included respectively in each system. We think that many Protestants who suppose that their educated fellow-christians of the Roman-Catholic Faith make use of pictures and images as objects of worship are under a mistake, a mistake which is neither creditable nor justifiable. We do not doubt that many Roman-Catholics use these things as useful accessories to worship, * and that many Protestants also make such use

* Essentially in the same way that music is made use of in many Protestant as well as Catholic churches.

of them. We know that many Protestants doctrinally (professedly) believe in a human mediator. We think that many Protestants hold and practice a belief in a human mediator, and in the human nature of a Being whom it is lawful to worship ; and that many do in fact (practically) pray to and worship a human-being, or a supposed human-being. Assuming such to be the case, we opine that, whether it be the mother of a human-being, or the human-being himself, or a human-being disguised under any pretence or supposition whatever, it is equally a violation of the express primary commandment of God, which commandment is plain and distinct, admitting of no modification in any kind or degree.

We state thus distinctly that, in respect to certain doctrines and shades of individual belief, included respectively in the two systems, we believe there is an approximation and practically an agreement between them, in order for it to be distinctly understood that, notwithstanding such partial agreement, we uphold that opposing, contrasting, and comparing the two systems, each as a whole, the one to the other, the definition we have given does correctly indicate the difference essentially characteristic between them, as distinct and opposed systems.

In order to appreciate the lesson taught by that chapter of the historical record which Macaulay has here brought forward for the instruction of the reader, attention should be given to an important division and distinction which may be considered to exist in that section of professing Christians known as the papal system. To denote this distinction by nomenclature we would restrict the term Roman-Catholics to that large part of the papal Christians which does not approve the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, and which does not acknowledge the possession of infallible judgment by the Pope, but which approves and acknowledges the Pope as the head of an episcopacy, over which he is considered by them

to exercise an authorized spiritual jurisdiction as head-bishop. The other large part of the papal section of Christians which approves the temporal sovereignty of the Pope and acknowledges him to possess infallibility of judgment we propose to term Papists.*

To understand correctly the practical lesson taught by the events of those years, it is, moreover, necessary to consider the rapid development and potent influence of that monastic society which was instituted and inaugurated by Ignatius Loyola. From the time of the institution of that society only a little more than a century elapsed before the publication of the Provincial Letters by the distinguished theologian and mathematician of Port Royal; letters which, although Pascal fell a victim to the vengeance of those whose hostility he had incurred, did much to immediately weaken, and afterwards to ruin and nearly destroy that influence and power which had overshadowed almost the whole of Europe.

It can scarcely be disputed, whatever differences of opinion there may be as to the relative quantities of good and evil fruit produced by that institution, that those objects, to the attainment of which its power and influence were applied, were, in a great measure, essentially different from those of its founder. Loyola, himself a Roman Catholic, convinced of the reality of the spiritual universe and that the terrestrial existence of man should be mainly employed as a training school by which to educate and prepare himself for the spiritual warfare and work of the intellectual spiritual man; Loyola who believed in the discipline of the intellectual faculties, in the subjection of the bodily inclinations, and in the acquisition of strict habits of obedience and submission to the Laws and the Will of the Spiritual Head, founded an institution the express object of which was to give effect to

* The expression having been long in use, is convenient, is without offence, and serves well to mark the important distinction.

that conviction, by a practical and systematic subordination of the temporal affairs, the most important as well as the most ordinary belonging to the terrestrial existence, to the express purpose of preparation for the spiritual existence.

But his successors, not having the same belief in the spiritual existence as a reality, and not sharing his convictions as to the objects of the terrestrial existence, perverted his institution and system to the promoting of objects and the accomplishment of purposes which were altogether terrestrial and temporal in their aim and character.

There may be those who wonder, looking to the surprising development of Loyola's system, that God, assuming His active and direct control over the terrestrial affairs of men as Supreme temporal Ruler, should have favoured or allowed for a time the development of an institution which, so far from devoting itself exclusively to the furtherance of religious instruction and the establishment of His spiritual kingdom upon earth, employed itself mainly in promoting secular objects, and made use of means for the attainment of those objects which, according even to the ordinary standard of morality, were unhallowed and iniquitous.

If there be any such persons, we commend to their consideration Macaulay's praise of the system as a means of concentrating the faculties and labour of a great number of men, as a disciplined force acting in combination, for the attainment of whatever might be considered by their chief as most advantageous to the interests of the society; and his praise of the ability, energy, perseverance, courage and devotion, with which the means were applied. And also we would remind them in this connection, of the educational purpose of the terrestrial existence of men.

For any one to complain that the conditions of man's terrestrial existence are such as we experience

them to be; or, to suppose that some other conditions or arrangement would be better; is no part of a reasonable argument, and therefore quite inadmissible: for, if the reasoner has assumed the actual existence of an all-wise Creator, and a future life of the human-being, it would be requisite for the human-being to have knowledge of the entire plan of human existence past, present, and future, to be able even to make the attempt to form any reasonable judgment at all about the matter. The most useful purpose, therefore, of the historical record is to furnish the means of ascertaining and understanding the nature of the educational-process and the manner in which the educational training is applied. If a man, assuming to himself the office of teacher, was at the present time, to put before the educated public a proposition . . . that it is inexpedient, impolitic, unjust, and contrary to the law of God, to do evil that good may result, the reply would be . . . no doubt your proposition is sound and true, but we know that already quite well, and therefore don't require to be taught it. Yes, . . . but how long since did educated men know this to be certainly true and to be a law of God? Did they know it a century since? Or two centuries since? Or three centuries since? And, at that time when they did not yet know, how were they to get certain knowledge about it? Would merely telling them have been sufficient? Could they have learnt it in any other way than by the hard practical logic of actual life? When men find by experience that their personal suffering is a consequence of other men acting on the principle of doing evil that good may come, and when this lesson has been repeated a sufficient number of times in various ways, they then understand that it is unjust so to act. This is our position now in the nineteenth century with regard to this question; we now know it well to be unjust and contrary to the law of God so to act. The lesson was a hard one to learn; many there were to be taught, and

many times and oft the lesson had to be repeated; but, perhaps, never before on so grand a scale as at that time when the followers of Loyola, having perverted the purpose of his institution, put in practice and worked out this principle in the face of all Europe. . . . and were condemned by the unanimous voice of the civilized world.

Let us now take an earlier page of the historical record; let us seek another instance where nation contended with nation for supremacy, and consider whether the lesson therein taught coincides with that inculcated by the long continued struggle between the Protestant and Papal systems of Christianity, and by the various episodes of that struggle.

MOHAMMED.

In the year A.D. 611, at a time when Boniface iv. was Pope of Rome, and the Greek Empire was being ravaged by Persians and Avars . . . at a time when the Anglo-Saxons and other tribes of northern Germany were becoming converts to Christianity; and, at about the time, when, in the town of London, a Christian church was being founded, which church was afterwards called Westminster Abbey. . . . a respectable man, about 40 years of age, living in the town of Mecca in Arabia, declared that he had received a mission from heaven. The man's name was Mohammed. He told his wife Kedijah that the angel Gabriel had brought him a message . . . he told her the words of the message, and she believed at once, and accepted him as the prophet of the nation.*

In person Mohammed was of middle stature, with dark eyes, and a ruddy complexion. He wore a thick beard. His mode of living was very plain; dates and water were often his only food, and his house was sometimes without fire for a month together. His manners, as well as his

* See Encyclopedia Britannica

appearance, were pleasing, and he was fond of setting off the comeliness of his person to the best advantage.

He was born at Mecca in A.D. 570 . . . was the son of Abdallah and Amina, and grandson of Abdelmottalib. He belonged to the noble family of Hashem, of the tribe of the Koreish, confessedly the first and most honourable tribe in Arabia. As his father died shortly before the birth, his grandfather Abdelmottalib took charge of and named him Mohammed (the glorified). He was nursed by a woman named Helima, and then by a black slave named Oumm Agman; towards both, and especially towards the latter, he always displayed much gratitude and attachment.

Tradition says that when the infant (Mohammed) was born, the palace of the King of Persia was shaken by an earthquake, and the sacred fire of the Magi extinguished.

Mohammed claimed to be descended from Ishmael; in consequence of his insistence on this point, as well as his partial recognition of Jesus, negotiations between him and the Jews were broken off.

Tradition narrates, of Mohammed's coffin, that it is suspended between heaven and earth.*

A few years after his assuming the character of a prophet, some of those who strongly disapproved his claims made him offers of wealth and leadership if he would give up his supposed mission; but he replied by reciting the legend which describes the destruction of the city and tribe of Ad for idolatry (known to English readers by Southey's *Thalaba*.)

After this he proclaimed "his famous night journey to heaven, known as *Isra*, when the angel Gabriel took him

* For the benefit of those who are not accustomed to read the figurative language of tradition, we observe that the obvious meaning is, that the system of religion taught by Mohammed was partly of heaven and partly of earth, or, in other words partly ideal and spiritual, and partly gross and carnal

on the animal Borac to enjoy an interview with patriarchs, prophets, and the Almighty himself. This brought on him a storm of ridicule, and some of his disciples abjured his teaching. Abu Beker (a man of note) stopped others from departure by professing his own entire belief in Mohammed's narrative." * (*Encyclopedia Britannica*.) In A. D. 628, the sixth year of the Hegira, he began to send letters to sovereign princes, not only in Arabia but beyond its limits. They were sealed with a silver signet containing in three lines the words

MOHAMMED.. APOSTLE.. OF GOD.

Persia, Abyssinia, and Egypt were the first recipients.

The Koran, (*Encyclopedia Britannica*) "Its leading features are. . . . The assertion of the unity of God. . . . The apostleship of Mohammed. . . . Its denunciation of idolatry, and recital of legends illustrative of the divine wrath against that great sin—Its recognition of previous prophets, as Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, and *Jesus* ; —Its account of angels—Gabriel and Michael,--Azrael the angel of death, and---Israfel who is to sound the trumpet at the last day ; of the fallen angels, and their prince Eblis (Satan) ; of heaven, hell, and the partition between them called Al Araf ; and of final judgment to come.

Respecting *Jesus-Christ* .. Mohammed teaches that though only a man, he was miraculously born, and that he wrought numberless miracles ; and, apparently from a belief that it was unworthy of Christ's dignity to be put to death, he denies the reality of his crucifixion, asserting with the Gnostics that another was put to death for him. Denying the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, the incar-

* In reference to this... we may remark that the story of this alleged vision, so far as we are aware, has not been carefully examined as to its allegorical meaning. The probability is at once suggested that the appearance of extravagance and absurdity may arise from misunderstanding the figurative language of allegory as intended in a merely literal sense. Evidently neither Mohammed himself, nor Abu Beker considered the story absurd and incredible

nation, and the atonement, he yet calls Christ. . . . the Word of God. . . . the Spirit from God, announces His second advent, and triumph over Anti-Christ, and teaches the doctrine of the millennium."

Mohammed claimed that the advent of such a teacher as he felt himself to be must have been foretold. His followers have applied to him certain texts; of which, Deuteronomy xxxiii. 2—where Mount Sinai, Seir, and Paran, are claimed to be predictions of Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism; and, St. John xvi. 7,—apparently alluded to in the 61st chap. of the Koran, the promised Paraclete being interpreted to mean Mohammed. (*) Without for the present offering any positive opinion as a judgment or conclusion on the question of the credibility of some part of Mohammed's claims as a prophet—we would suggest that very much of the argument made use of against those claims is inconclusive because based on insufficient evidence, and also, appears to be much vitiated by prejudice, (dogmatism). For instance, it is taken for granted, that the Koran is, in a great measure, manufactured out of material taken from the Bible. Direct evidence does no more than establish a possibility or probability that Mohammed did possess and read a copy of the Old and New Testaments, because it is not impossible or improbable that he may have done so. Now, if we go on the internal evidence only, and argue because certain circumstantial statements, names, and occurrences, which are mentioned in the Bible are mentioned also in the Koran, therefore the Koran is, at

* The writer in the Encyc. Britann. observes....."(Just as the followers of Manes had referred it to him)...a blasphemous view, though not intentionally such. Mohammed, confounding and identifying the Holy Spirit with the angel Gabriel, utterly mistook the drift of this prophecy..." To which we will append the suggestion..... that it were better to leave Mohammed's doctrines for consideration and judgment on their merits (as a system having a distinct individuality of its own ?) The positive judgment of the writer in the Encyc., being unsupported by argument, must be considered as possibly a prejudice.

least, in part, copied from the Bible, such argument is begging the question as to whether or no Mohammed was inspired; for, if he was inspired, evidently he may have stated the facts without having copied from or having seen the Bible. Again, if we assume that the 61st chapter of the Koran does refer to St. John xvi. 7, and purports to be an interpretation of the meaning—the value of the interpretation will depend very much upon the true answer to the question whether or no Mohammed was inspired, because, if inspired at all, it must be held to be most probable that he was inspired in a very high degree; probably in a much higher degree than any other man since the time of the Christian Apostles. Wherefore we suggest that, if he assigns a particular meaning to a difficult passage of Scripture, it should not be dogmatically contradicted and thrown aside as worthless, but should be very carefully noted and examined. On this head, it may be observed that, if a man, almost uneducated, having no cultivated taste for music, and no knowledge of literary art, be supposed to write a book with such a purpose as that of the Koran—then supposing him to compose a part of the book under express inspiration, and, with respect to the remainder, to be left, in a great measure, to his own imagination and knowledge, the result might reasonably be expected to be just such a book as the Koran actually is.

MOHAMMEDANISM BECOMES A GREAT NATION.—*History.*

The whole of Arabia has been converted by persuasion and force to the faith of Islam. And Mohammed has died.

Abu Beker, his successor, in the 12th year of the Hegira, prepares for the invasion of Syria . . . Sends a summons to the Chiefs of the Arab tribes to join the standard of Mohammed, and soon finds himself at the head of a large and enthusiastic army.

Bosra is the first to fall before the strategy and impetuous valor of the Moslems. Then Damascus is besieged under the able leadership of the fierce Khaled.. and, after a resistance of 70 days, is also taken.

Mohammed's successor, the Caliph Abu Beker, dies and is succeeded by Omar. The progress of the victorious army continues..... The strong city Baalbec, with its famous temple of Baal is besieged and taken.. Emessa is captured. The great battle of Yernouk is fought.. and the fate of Syria decided. Jerusalem is besieged and taken.. then Tripoli and Tyre. And the conquest of Syria is completed.

Egypt is next invaded... the ancient cities of Memphis and Alexandria successively yield to the standard of Mohammed... and before long the whole of Egypt is subjected to the power of the Caliph. In the meantime Persia has been invaded. The decisive battle of Kadesia is won by the invaders.. and Madayn, the wealthy and luxurious Capital, deserted by her King, is left, undefended, a prey to the conquerors.

The Caliph Omar receives his death wounds from the assassin's dagger, and leaves the scene. But the victorious progress of the Moslem arms continues with the same rapidity... Persia is completely overrun; the King slain; and the proud Kingdom reduced to a tributary province.

Where is the tide of conquest to be stayed?

Under the general Musa Ibn Nassy, Africa—that is, the then known part of Africa,—is conquered.

Europe is marked out for spoil. The treachery of Count Julian affords an advantageous opportunity to gain an entrance. Under the generals Taric and Musa, Spain is invaded . . . the great battle of Gaudalete is fought . . the unfortunate King Roderick is slain or disappears . . and, after some further resistance, Spain is subdued. The conquest is consolidated and then. . . France.

But the conquest of Europe by the Mohammedans was not ordained. He who had said to the waves, 'so far and no further shalt thou go'.... Who had said of Ishmael, 'I will make of him a great nation'.... had also said, 'the son of the bond woman must not be heir with the son of the free woman.' The child born to Abraham in Western Europe, at about the time when Mohammed commenced his ministration, has now grown, not indeed to the full strength of manhood, but to an age when the strength of early youth enables him to take his allotted part in the great drama of the world's history. The Saracen army which had invaded France is met by the Christian army under Charles Martel near Poitiers and defeated with great slaughter. Another Saracen army advances into France and soon meets the same fate. Europe is, humanly speaking, saved from subjugation. The sons of Ishmael retire into Spain and attempt the invasion of France no more.

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUED.

"Upwards of eight hundred years were passed and gone since the Arabian invaders sealed the perdition of Spain by the defeat of Don Roderick."* In the year 1481, the capitulation for the surrender of Granada to the Christians was signed. Then came the mournful farewell and bitter leave-taking as King Boabdil and his companions, 'gazed in an agony of tenderness and grief' on the beloved city from which they were departing for ever; "when the heart of the king softened by misfortunes and overcharged with grief could no longer contain itself, 'Allah achbar! 'God is great!' said he, but, the words of resignation died upon his lips and he burst into a flood of tears." (*)

* Washington Irving (Chronicle of the Conquest of Granada.)

We have now to consider these historical events as evidences and illustrations sustaining our fundamental proposition and disproving that of Macaulay. Not only a government professing a religious system but a national government directly based upon and constantly referring itself to the primary fact of theology here presents itself to the mental vision. The connection was not productive of absurdity as Macaulay supposes it necessarily must be. It is needless to put into fresh words that which has been not long since admirably expressed by an eminent man of science, (*) a teacher who, although no longer with us in the body, continues still to teach; one, "who being dead, yet speaketh."

The Islamite Principle. *From Maurice's Religions of the World*, "But these sweeping conquests of Mahomet are susceptible of yet another interpretation which has sometimes been applied to the whole history of their dominion; they may be regarded as the righteous judgments of God upon guilty nations, whether these were the idolators of India, the fireworshippers of Persia, the corrupted Greek, or the Visigoth. It is difficult, I should think, for any person really taking the Bible as his guide, nay, for any person recognizing a Divine Providence at all, not to look upon every great earthquake which has shaken kingdoms as a Divine visitation; not to see a Divine hand regulating outward circumstances, and the wills of men. Nor can we go so far without going further, and asking what the state of those nations was on which the scourge descended? If we pursue the enquiry fairly in this case, we shall be led, it seems to me, to the discovery of the real ground of the Mahometan might, and perhaps to regard the continuance of that might through so many ages not wholly as a calamity. In the Christian Nations which were permitted to fall under the armies of Islam, almost as much as in those which were

(*) The Rev. Frederick D. Maurice, late Prof. of Theology.

avowedly Pagan, the sense of a Divine Almighty Will, to which all human wills were to be lowered, had evaporated amidst the worship of images, amidst moral corruptions, philosophical theories, religious controversies. Notions about God more or less occupied them; but God Himself was not in all their thoughts. The awe of an Absolute Eternal Being, to be obeyed as well as to be confessed, was passing away in some—had scarcely been awakened in others. The soldiers of Mahomet said, by their words and acts, ‘God verily is, and man is his minister, to accomplish his will upon earth.’ This we shall find was the inspiring thought in the warriors of the Crescent—this gave them valour, subordination, discipline. This, where it encountered no like or equal feeling in the minds of those among whom they came, made them invincible. We must not be content with talking of their armies; here was the life of their armies. We must not speak of men’s readiness to receive an imposture; in yielding to this assertion they were yielding to a truth. This was no verbal copy from ancient records; it may have been the oldest of all verities, but it was fresh and new for every one who acted upon it. It was no mere phrase out of a book—no homage to a mortal hero, no mere denial of other men’s faith. Let us go yet further and say, It was a mercy of God that such a witness, however bare of other supporting principles, however surrounded by confusions, should have been borne to His Name, when His creatures were ready practically to forget it. The first Mahometan conquest, the continued Mahometan dominion, prove the assertion ‘God is’ to be no dry proposition, (*) but one which is capable of exercising a mastery over the rudest tribes, of giving them an order, of making them victorious over all the civilization and all the religion which had not this principle for its basis.”

(*) But we understand the Mohammedan assertion to have the meaning God is Supreme; or, more fully, God is the Supreme Ruler of the Earth.

“I think that most persons studying the history of Mahometanism without prejudice, will feel that this is the principle which confronts them at every turn, and to which everything else is subordinate. And if so, the consideration is surely a very important one for our purpose. We are told that the mere theological part of religious systems is only a loose, flimsy drapery for certain maxims of morality, or certain ideas about the nature and spiritual destinies of man. Precisely the opposite assertion is true. All mere maxims, all mere ideas about the nature of man, have proved weak and helpless before this proclamation of a living and Eternal God. The theological transcendent principle is just the one which has stood its ground, which has re-appeared age after age, which the most ignorant warriors felt was true and mighty for them, for which no cultivation has provided any substitute. We are told, again, that the character of particular localities and races determines what shall be the character of a theology ; that that only is universal which concerns the laws of outward nature or the life of man. How does the history of Mahometanism bear out this opinion ? Let it be granted that the soil of Arabia was one on which it was fitting that such doctrine as that of Mahomet should be first preached ; let it be allowed that the Semitic race has been especially distinguished from every other by an interest in what is purely divine, by a comparative indifference to what is human. But here is an assertion which tribes the most remote from this are compelled to recognize ; which establishes itself in India, in Syria, in Egypt, in Greece. And it is remarkable that, while numerous sects and parties have been called into existence by questions respecting the proper successors of Mahomet, or the interpretation of the Koran, the Divine principle among them has been the uniting one. It is said again, that the great doctrines which have been embodied in religious systems are the creations of the religious principle in ”

“man;—that his faith moulds the object which it worships: in other words, that what is called theological truth is but some outward expression of our feelings or habits of mind. Look again at the history of Mahometanism; consider the facts steadily: there are none to which the supporters of this theory should more gladly appeal. They can find no instance of a race of which faith in an unseen object has been more characteristic. ‘Faithful’ is the very name by which the Islamite warriors proclaim themselves to the world. . . But what was the nature of this fact. It meant nothing, it was nothing, except so far as it asserted a Being not dependent on itself; the ground of man’s being; one of whom he was the minister, not the creator. The Mahometan believed that the God whom he worshipped must have revealed himself—that man could not have discovered Him. He (the Mahometan) went forth to beat into powder all the Gods which he supposed man had invented. Take away these characteristics from his faith and it vanishes, with all the doings which were the fruits of it.”

“When I spoke to you of the great power by which the Mahometan soldier was carried along in his enterprises, of the principle which gave him strength and endurance, you may have wondered that I did not dwell more upon the rewards which were promised to him after death, upon the Paradise of sensual felicity for which the brave man was encouraged to hope. I did not allude to this motive, because I do not believe that it was the one by which the Mahometan hosts were really inspired. The mighty conviction that they were then, at that very moment, called by God to a work—that they were His witnesses and were the ministers of His vengeance, was I believe, immeasurably more effective than any dreams, were they ever so gross and palpable, of what might be given to them hereafter. When they had already cast themselves away to live or die, they had a sense of immortality which no such visions could impart, and which alone made them invincible.”

“ But when the Mahometan was at peace, the belief of a mighty Sovereign to whom he was doing homage, no longer sufficed him; he began to ask himself what he was living for? To the multitude these sensual pleasures were a tolerable answer. These were the things to be desired; for these, by whatsoever means the Koran or its interpreters prescribed, if they were in earnest, they were to labor. Some, with higher apprehensions, would feel that such rewards were not satisfying: they would explain away the language of Mahomet, and pursue the practices, to which the others submitted in hope of earthly gratifications, that they might attain the knowledge or vision of God. The former would fall into gross moral corruptions, the latter would indulge in philosophical speculations—would found sects—would substitute theories and notions for that Being in whose name their fathers had fought. This has actually been the case, and hence it has been proved that Mahometanism can only thrive while it is aiming at conquest. Why? Because it is the proclamation of a mere Sovereign who employs men to declare the fact that he is a Sovereign and to enforce it upon the world. It is not the proclamation of a great moral Being who designs to raise His creatures out of their sensual and natural degradation; who reveals to them not merely that He is, but *what* He is—why He has created them—what they have to do with Him. Unless this mighty chasm in the Mahometan doctrine can be filled up, it must wither day by day—wither for all the purposes of utility to mankind; it can leave nothing behind but a wretched carcase, filling the air with the infection of its rotteness.”

Having taken this extract from the work of the late Prof. Maurice, we have determined to let it stand as the teaching on the subject of a very eminent, enlightened and well-known theologian; although, on close examination, we find that it does not, in some respects, very

clearly set forth the characteristics of the Mohammedan, as distinguished from the Christian faith, which we are desirous to put before the reader.

The latter part of the preceding remarks are applicable to a corrupt and degraded condition of Islamism rather than to pure Mohammedanism as a distinctive religious system. We certainly fear there is too much cause to apprehend that the objections, here brought by Prof. Maurice against Mohammedanism in a state of peace, apply also with much force to the Christianity of countries, even, which are considered highly civilized. Let us take again the very words in which that condemnation is conveyed. "Some with higher apprehension would feel that such rewards (i.e. the sensual promises of the Koran) were not satisfying; they would explain away the language of Mahomet, and pursue the practices, to which the others submitted in hope of earthly gratifications, that they might attain the knowledge or vision of God. The former would fall into gross moral corruptions, the latter would indulge in philosophical speculations—would found sects—would substitute theories and notions for that Being in whose name their fathers had fought."

But are there not Christians who are under the supposition that they are promised, if they profess a certain belief and perform perseveringly certain religious rites and unpleasant duties during the present life, an after existence of sensual (bodily) enjoyments in some *place* called heaven? And are there not Christians, who, feeling that such an explanation is not satisfying, explain away the language of the promise and avoid the gross conceptions only to fall into philosophical speculations and to substitute theories and notions for that Being in whose name their fathers fought, or perhaps suffered martyrdom?

On the other hand we think that any one reading dispassionately what is known of the latter part of Mo-

hammed's life will most probably conclude that, besides having a very distinct recognition of the Supreme Being, as a living Person, his conception of the after existence was by no means altogether gross and sensual. And, moreover, for ourselves, we will express our belief that amongst the more educated Mohammedans of later times there are very many whose conception, both of the Supreme Being and of the after Existence, is essentially spiritual and not sensual, or grossly sensual; and that, at the same time, their faith in God is a sincere, distinct and vital, although not a highly enlightened faith.

But are we then to be understood as meaning there is no great difference, as a true theological system between Mohammedanism and Christianity? No, on the contrary we believe there is a very great difference.

That difference, as we understand it, is essentially that the one (Christianity) is a complete system of theology including both temporal and spiritual theology; whilst the other (Mohammedanism) is mainly a system of temporal theology only. We do not mean that Mohammedanism has no reference to the spiritual existence; we have previously stated that we believe it to have such a reference when correctly understood, and that there are very many Mohammedans who do, in fact, so understand its meaning. But the spiritual existence of the Mohammedan theology is a future state of existence altogether distinct and separate from the present, excepting that it is promised as a reward to those who acknowledge God as the Supreme temporal Ruler, and who serve Him with loyalty and devotion during the life on earth. It is a religion of submission and reliance, based on belief in the almighty Power and Truthfulness of God. Submission to the will of God, because, as Creator and absolute Sovereign, He has a right to absolute submission; and reliance upon His promise, because He is Almighty and Truthful. But Christianity contains all this, for the Old Testament and the Mosaic Theology belong to

Christianity as well as the spiritual theology based on the manifestation of Christ upon the earth. Now the great difference is that the Love of God is in the Christian spiritual theology taught and demonstrated to be the true basis of the spiritual existence, and, moreover, that the spiritual existence, not being dependent on the mere life of the body, belongs to the present condition of the human being as much as to the future, and will commence as soon as the individual accepts the conditions and makes the requisite preparation; which conditions, as well as the nature of the preparation required, is fully explained and taught. This, then, is the important difference. The one system of theology (the Mohammedan) is the direct acknowledgment and active recognition of God as Almighty and absolute Ruler of the Earth, and reliance on His Truthfulness to fulfill His promise. The other system, (the Christian), also recognizes God in the same manner with reference to the temporal existence of human-beings as men, only; but, also, recognizes God as the spiritual Father of all men who earnestly desire and claim such relationship, and who then become bound together by the ties of brotherhood and of common son-ship to God as the Father of them all. Contrasted with each other, the one may be termed the theology of submission and reliance, and the other the theology of love. But it does not follow, because the last is far more advantageous, elevating the man, at once, to a higher state of existence and bestowing the privilege of son-ship to God, together with immortality, . . . that the first is not a sound and sufficient theology. It includes the recognition of God and the educational training of submission to His will as the purpose of the terrestrial life of man. And this we opine is the essential basis of sound theology.

In order to put the teaching of the late Prof. Maurice, on the immediate subject, somewhat more fully before the reader, we will give two more short extracts from the same work already quoted.

The Religions of the World.—"You have found a set of men brought up in circumstances altogether different from yours, holding your faith in abhorrence, who say in language the most solemn and decisive, 'Whatever else we part with, this is needful to us and to all human beings—the belief that God is—the recognition of Him as a living personal Being.' You have seen this faith growing weak for a time, and everything else growing weak with it; you have seen it reappear, finding a new set of champions to assert it, compelling nations to bow down before it. Be sure that here is something which the heart and reason within you have need of—which they must grasp. Be quite sure that, if you give them in place of it, any fine notions or theories; if you feed them with phrases about the beautiful or the godlike, when they want the source of beauty, the living God; if you entertain them with any images or symbols of art or nature when they want that which is symbolized; if you talk about physical laws when you want the law given, of mechanical properties when you want him who set them in motion, of secret powers when you want him who acts by them and upon you, you are cheating yourselves—cheating mankind. Remember further, that the acknowledgment of the Being may imply much more than the Mahometan perceived, but that it does imply *that* which he perceived. If such an One is, His will must be the law of the universe. Every creature in the universe must be in a right or wrong position, must be doing his work well or failing in it, as he yields himself to this will, or as he resists it. And let us not fancy that the early Mahometan was entirely mistaken as to the way in which this will ought to be obeyed. He may not have understood *what* enemies he had to fight with, what weapons he had to wield, but he did discover that the life of man is to be a continual battle, that we are only men when we are engaging in a battle. He was right that there is something in the world which we are not to tol-

erate, which we are sent to exterminate. First of all, let us seek that we may be freed from it ourselves ; but let us be taught by the Mussulman that we shall not compass this end unless we believe, and act upon this belief, that every man and every nation exists for the purpose of chasing falsehood and evil out of God's universe."

"I have talked of the victories of the Crescent in different quarters of the Globe, and it is not easy to exaggerate the greatness of these victories. Yet we all know they were not complete ; they did not exterminate that which they were meant to exterminate. I do not speak now of the resistance which this great power encountered from the hammer of the Mayor of Paris, or from the heroes in the Asturian mountains. I do not speak of anything which is directly connected with Christianity. I mean that the most remarkable of the polytheistic faiths, though crushed, were not cast out ; that some of the countries which yielded to Mahometans are not Mahometan. It behoves us to inquire into the meaning of this fact—to ask ourselves, what there was in their doctrines, compounded of all strange elements, sanctioning so many fearful crimes, for which the simple and purer Mahometan faith could provide no satisfaction. We may find that convictions which the Mahometan trampled down, do as much require recognition as those which he enforced ; that man has demands for himself which will not be satisfied by being told that he is the servant of an absolute Will—demands which must, somehow or other, find their explanation, must in some way or other be reconciled with that great truth."

Very much of the adverse argument of the writer in the *Encyc. Brit.* appears to be negatived by his own quotations from 'Möhler,' e. g., "That many millions of men feed and foster from the Koran an estimable moral and religious life ; and one cannot think that they are drawing from an empty spring, from the composition of a mere deceiver."

In taking leave for the present of this division of the subject, we will remark two facts : 1. 'In the second chapter of the Koran . . . Jews, Christians, and Sabians are all placed upon a level and assured of salvation if obedient to the law of their respective creeds.' 2. There are no conversions from Mohammedanism to Christianity.

Let us take one more example from the Record Let us now briefly direct our attention to the History of England at about the middle of the seventeenth century.

The civil war is over King Charles has suffered the consequences of misgovernment The ruler who had "placed England at the head of the Protestant interest and in the first rank of Christian powers" and "who had taught every nation to value her friendship and dread her enmity" is also about to leave the scene. Macaulay thus describes the great general and his puritan soldiers : "Cromwell never looked on war till he was more than forty years old. He had first to form himself and then to form his troops. Out of raw levies he created an army, the bravest and the best disciplined, the most orderly in peace, and the most terrible in war, that Europe had seen . . . He called this body into existence. He led it to conquest. He never fought a battle without gaining it. He never gained a battle without annihilating the force opposed to him. Yet his victories were not the highest glory of his military system. The respect which his troops paid to property, their attachment to the laws and religion of their country, their submission to the civil power, their temperance, their intelligence, their industry, are without parallel. It was after the Restoration that the spirit which their great leader had infused into them was signal-ly displayed. At the command of the established government, an established government which had no means of enforcing obedience, fifty thousand soldiers whose backs no enemy had ever seen, either in domestic or in continental war, laid down their arms, and retired into the

mass of the people, thenceforward to be distinguished only by superior diligence, sobriety, and regularity in the pursuits of peace, from the other members of the community which they had saved."

In bringing forward this example, it is not with the intention of commending these men as exemplary Christians in an educated sense; but they were men who professed, confessed, and acknowledged with a sincere and active recognition the supreme temporal King; and believed in His personal government. Their theology was perhaps more nearly akin to Mohammedanism than to pure Christianity. That they were self-righteous, and that their language was oftentimes blasphemous, is but too true; but they had strong faith that God could and would give them victory, and in that faith they conquered.

The past history of the human race is before the student, the educational process to which man has been subjected through the ages past and gone, is therein unfolded—his ignorance at the commencement—his strong desire for knowledge—his perversity in refusing to learn—the occasions on which he gladly listened, and the occasions on which he stubbornly refused to listen, to the voice of the Great Teacher—and the consequences which resulted, are therein recorded.... That record has been written for our learning.

We have stated at the commencement that the immediate purpose of this Essay is to caution the student, especially the English student, against the guidance of one who is thought by very many to be both trusty and safe—to be clear of vision, and to know the road. To prevent misunderstanding we now disclaim any intention or desire whatever to judge Macaulay as an individual or to detract from his great reputation in so far as that reputation is justly merited. We have no doubt, and we do not wish to lead others to doubt, that

he was a Christian. There are passages in Macaulay's writings in which the truth and blessedness of Christianity is set forth with that clearness and felicity of diction in which he so much excelled ; as, for example in the following from his review of Southey's 'Colloquies on Society.'

" We will not be deterred by any fear of misrepresentation from expressing our hearty approbation of the mild, wise, and eminently Christian manner in which the Church and the Government have lately acted with respect to blasphemous publications. We praise them for not having thought it necessary to encircle a religion pure, merciful, and philosophical, a religion to the evidence of which the highest intellects have yielded, with the defences of a false and bloody superstition. The ark of God was never taken till it was surrounded by the arms of earthly defenders. In captivity, its sanctity was sufficient to vindicate it from insult, and to lay the hostile fiend prostrate on the threshold of his own temple. The real security of Christianity is to be found in its benevolent morality, in its exquisite adaptation to the human heart, in the facility with which its scheme accommodates itself to the capacity of every human intellect, in the consolation which it bears to the house of mourning, in the light with which it brightens the great mystery of the grave. To such a system it can bring no addition of dignity or strength, that it is part and parcel of the common law. It is not now for the first time left to rely on the forces of its own evidence and the attractions of its own beauty. Its sublime philosophy confounded the Grecian schools in the fair conflict of reason with reason. The bravest and wisest of the Cæsars found their arms and their policy unavailing when opposed to the weapons that were not carnal and the kingdom that was not of this world. The victory which Porphyry and Diocletian failed to gain is not, to all appearance, reserved for any of those who

have in this age directed their attacks against the last restraint of the powerful and the last hope of the wretched."

But neither may we be deterred from distinctly stating that the good effect of such passages is at least neutralized by others which lead, or leave, the reader to infer that whether he adopt one or other religious system as the expression of his belief in his Maker, is of no particular moment, and that, even if he does not think it necessary to come to any distinct belief on the subject of religion, he may still be a worthy, useful and beneficent member of society. * As a christian teacher judgment has been already pronounced against Macaulay. The church of which he was so distinguished a member ; in which the preacher has almost forgotten for Whom he is to be expressly a witness, in which much debate has taken the place of prayer, and in which, on the most important subject of all, illegitimate philosophy has well-nigh ousted truth from the pulpit ; is the church of the Laodiceans, that church to which are addressed the words :

'I know thy works that thou art neither cold nor hot :
I would thou wert cold or hot.'

* *For instance, 'The Essay on the Civil Disabilities of the Jews.'*

"The points of difference between Christianity and Judaism have very much to do with a man's fitness to be a bishop or a rabbi. But they have no more to do with his fitness to be a magistrate, a legislator, or a minister of finance than with his fitness to be a cobbler, etc."

THE APPENDIX.

THE LEGEND OF THE ENCHANTED TOWER.

From Washington Irving's Conquest of Spain...

(The marvellous circumstance is said to have taken place shortly before the invasion of Spain by the Moors under Taric.)

“Heaven, at this time, say the old Spanish chronicles, permitted a marvellous intimation of the wrath with which it intended to visit the monarch and his people in punishment of their sins, nor are we, say the same orthodox writers, to startle and withhold our faith, when we meet in the page of discreet and sober history with those signs and portents which transcend the probabilities of ordinary life; for the revolutions of Empires and the downfall of mighty Kingdoms are awful events, that shake the physical as well as the moral world, and are often announced by forerunning marvels and prodigious omens.

Now, so it happened, according to the legend, that about this time, as King Roderick was seated one day on his throne, surrounded by his nobles, in the ancient city of Toledo, two men of venerable appearance entered the hall of audience. Their snowy beards descended to their breasts and their grey hairs were bound with ivy. They were arrayed in white garments of foreign or antiquated fashion, which swept the ground, and were cinctured with girdles wrought with the signs of the Zodiac, from which were suspended enormous bunches of keys of every variety of form.

Having approached the throne and made obeisance: “Know, O King,” said one of the old men, “that in the days of yore, when Hercules of Lybia, surnamed the Strong,

had set up his pillars at the ocean strait, he erected a tower near to this ancient city of Toledo. He built it of prodigious strength, and finished it with magic art, shutting up within it a fearful secret, never to be penetrated without peril and disaster. To protect this terrible mystery he closed the entrance to the edifice with a ponderous door of iron, secured by a great lock of steel, and he left a command that every King who should succeed him, should add another lock to the portal, denouncing woe and destruction on him who should eventually unfold the secret of the tower.'

'The guardianship of the portal was given to our ancestors, and has continued in our family from generation to generation, since the days of Hercules. Several kings, from time to time, have caused the gate to be thrown open, and have attempted to enter, but have paid dearly for their temerity. Some have perished within the threshold, others have been overwhelmed with horror at tremendous sounds, which shook the foundations of the earth, and have hastened to reclose the door, and secure it with its thousand locks. Thus since the days of Hercules, the inmost recesses of the pile have never been penetrated by mortal man, and a profound mystery continues to prevail over this great enchantment. This, O'King, is all we have to relate, and our errand is to entreat thee to repair to the tower and affix thy lock to the portal, as has been done by all thy predecessors," Having thus said, the ancient men made a profound reverence and departed from the presence chamber.*

Don Roderick remained for some time lost in thought after the departure of the men ; he then dismissed all his court, excepting the venerable Urbino, at that time archbishop of Toledo. The long white beard of this

* *Perdita de Espana* por Abulcasim Tarif Abentarique, lib. 1, cap. 6.—*Cronica del Rey Don Rodrigo por el moro Rasis*, lib. 1, cap. 1.—*Bleda, Cron. capi. VII.*

prelate bespoke his advanced age, and his overhanging eyebrows showed him a man full of wary counsel.

‘Father,’ said the King, ‘I have an earnest desire to penetrate the mystery of this tower. The worthy prelate shook his hoary head: ‘Beware, my son,’ said he; ‘there are secrets hidden from man for his good. Your predecessors for many generations have respected this mystery, and have increased in might and empire. A knowledge of it, therefore, is not material to the welfare of your Kingdom. Seek not, then, to indulge a rash and unprofitable curiosity, which is interdicted under such awful menaces.’

‘Of what importance,’ cried the King, ‘are the menaces of Hercules, the Lybian? Was he not a pagan? and can his enchantments have aught avail against a believer in our holy faith? Doubtless in this tower are locked up treasures of gold and jewels, amassed in days of old, the spoils of mighty kings, the riches of the pagan world. My coffers are exhausted, I have need of supply; and surely it would be an acceptable act in the eyes of Heaven to draw forth this wealth which lies buried under profane and necromantic spells, and consecrate it to religious purposes.’

The Venerable Archbishop still continued to remonstrate; but Don Roderick heeded not his counsel, for he was led on by his malignant star. ‘Father,’ said he, ‘it is in vain you attempt to dissuade me; my resolution is fixed. To-morrow I will explore the hidden mystery, or rather the hidden treasures, of this tower.’

The morning sun shone brightly upon the cliff-built towers of Toledo, when King Roderick issued out of the gate of the City at the head of a numerous train of courtiers and cavaliers, and crossed the bridge that bestrides the deep rocky bed of the Tagus. The shining cavalcade wound up the road that leads among the mountains, and soon came in sight of the necromantic tower.

Of this renowned edifice marvels are related by the ancient Arabian and Spanish chroniclers; 'and I doubt much,' adds the venerable Agapida, 'whether many readers will not consider the whole as a cunningly devised fable, sprung from an oriental imagination; but it is not for me to reject a fact which is recorded by all those writers who are the fathers of our national history; a fact, too, which is as well attested as most of the remarkable events in the story of Don Roderick. None but light and inconsiderate minds,' continues the good friar, 'do hastily reject the marvellous. To the thinking mind the whole world is enveloped in mystery, and everything is full of type and portent. To such a mind the necromantic tower of Toledo will appear as one of those wondrous monuments of the olden time; one of those Egyptian and Chaldaic piles, storied with hidden wisdom and mystic prophecy which have been devised in past ages, when man yet enjoyed an intercourse with high and spiritual natures, and when human foresight partook of divination.'

This singular tower was round, and of great height and grandeur; erected upon a lofty rock and surrounded by crags and precipices. The foundation was supported by four brazen lions, each taller than a cavalier on horseback; the walls were built of small pieces of jasper, and variously coloured marble, not larger than a man's hand, so subtly joined together, however, that, but for their different hues, they might be taken for one entire stone. They were arranged with marvellous cunning, so as to represent battles and warlike deeds of times and heroes long since passed away, and the whole surface was so admirably polished that the stones were as lustrous as glass, and reflected the rays of the sun with such resplendent brightness as to dazzle all beholders.*

* 'From the minute account of the good friar, drawn from the ancient chronicles, it would appear that the walls of the tower were pictured in mosaic work.' (Washing. Irving.)

King Roderick and his courtiers arrived wondering and amazed at the foot of the rock. Here there was a narrow arched way cut through the living stone; the only entrance to the tower. It was closed by a massive iron gate, covered with rusty locks of divers workmanship, and in the fashion of different centuries, which had been affixed by the predecessors of Don Roderick. On either side of the portal stood the two ancient guardians of the tower, laden with the keys appertaining to the locks.

The King alighted, and, approaching the portals, ordered the guardians to unlock the gate. The hoary-headed men drew back with terror. 'Alas!' cried they, 'what is it your majesty requires of us? Would you have the mischiefs of this tower unbound and let loose, to shake the earth to its foundations?'

The Venerable Archbishop Urbino likewise implored him not to disturb a mystery which had been held sacred from generation to generation, within the memory of man; and which even Cæsar himself, when Sovereign of Spain, had not ventured to invade. The youthful cavaliers, however, were eager to pursue the adventure, and encouraged him in his rash curiosity.

'Come what may,' exclaimed Don Roderick, 'I am resolved to penetrate the mystery of this tower.' So saying, he again commanded the guardians to unlock the portals.

The ancient men obeyed with fear and trembling, but their hands shook with age, and when they applied the keys, the locks were so rusted by time, or of such strange workmanship, that they resisted their feeble efforts; whereupon the young cavaliers pressed forward and lent their aid. Still the locks were so numerous and difficult, that with all their eagerness and strength, a great part of the day was exhausted before the whole of them could be mastered.

When the last bolt had yielded to the key, the guardians and the reverend Archbishop again entreated the King to pause and reflect. 'Whatever is within this tower,' said they, 'is as yet harmless, and lies bound under a mighty spell: venture not then to open a door which may let forth a flood of evil upon the land.' But the anger of the King was roused, and he ordered that the portal should be instantly thrown open. In vain, however, did one after another exert his strength; and equally in vain did the cavaliers unite their forces, and apply their shoulders to the gate; though there was neither bar nor bolt remaining, it was perfectly immovable.

The patience of the King was now exhausted, and he advanced to apply his hand; scarcely, however, did he touch the iron gate, when it swung slowly open, uttering, as it were, a dismal groan as it turned reluctantly upon its hinges.

A cold damp wind issued forth accompanied by a tempestuous sound. The hearts of the ancient guardians quaked within them, and their knees smote together; but several of the youthful cavaliers rushed in, eager to gratify their curiosity, or to signalize themselves in the redoubtable enterprise. They had scarcely advanced a few paces, however, when they recoiled, overcome by the baleful air, or by some fearful vision.*

Upon this, the King ordered that fires should be kindled to dispel the darkness, and to correct the noxious and long imprisoned air; he then led the way into the interior; but though stout of heart, he advanced with awe and hesitation.

After proceeding a short distance, he entered a hall, or antechamber, on the opposite side of which was a door; and before it, on a pedestal, stood a gigantic figure, of the colour of bronze, and of a terrible aspect.

* Bleda, Cronica, Cap. 7.

It held a large mace, which it whirled incessantly, giving such cruel and resounding blows upon the earth as to prevent all further entrance.

The King paused at sight of this appalling figure: for whether it were a living being, or a statue of magic artifice, he could not tell. On its breast was a scroll, whereon was inscribed in large letters 'I do my duty.'*

After a little while Roderick plucked up heart, and addressed it with great solemnity: 'Whatever thou be,' said he, 'know that I come not to violate this sanctuary, but to inquire into the mystery it contains; I conjure thee, therefore, to let me pass in safety.'

Upon this, the figure paused with uplifted mace, and the King and his train passed unmolested through the door. They now entered a vast chamber, of a rare and sumptuous architecture, difficult to be described. The walls were incrustcd with the most precious gems, so joined together as to form one smooth and perfect surface. The lofty dome appeared to be self-supported, and was studded with gems, lustrous as the stars of the firmament. There was neither wood nor any other common or base material to be seen throughout the edifice. There were no windows or other openings to admit the day, yet a radiant light was spread throughout the palace, which seemed to shine from the walls, and to render every object distinctly visible. In the centre of this hall stood a table of alabaster of the rarest workmanship, on which was inscribed in Greek characters that Hercules Alcides, the Theban Greek, had founded this tower in the year of the world three thousand and six.

Upon the table stood a golden casket, richly set round with precious stones, and closed with a lock of mother-of-pearl; and on the lid were inscribed the following words:—

'In this coffer is contained the mystery of the tower.

* Bleda, *Chronica*, Cap. 7.

The hand of none but a King can open it; but let him beware! for marvellous events will be revealed to him, which are to take place before his death.'

King Roderick boldly seized upon the casket. The Venerable Archbishop laid his hand upon his arm, and made a last remonstrance. 'Forbear, my son!' said he; 'desist while there is yet time. Look not into the mysterious decrees of Providence. God has hidden them in mercy from our sight, and it is impious to rend the veil by which they are concealed.'

'What have I to dread from a knowledge of the future?' replied Roderick, with an air of haughty presumption. 'If good be destined me, I shall enjoy it by anticipation: if evil, I shall arm myself to meet it.' So saying, he rashly broke the lock.

Within the coffer he found nothing but a linen cloth, folded between two tablets of copper. On unfolding it, he beheld printed on it figures of men on horseback, of fierce demeanor, clad in turbans and robes of various colours, after the fashion of the Arabs, with scimitars hanging from their necks, and cross-bows at their saddle-backs, and they carried banners and pennons with divers devices. Above them was inscribed in Greek characters, 'Rash monarch! behold the men who are to hurl thee from thy throne, and subdue thy kingdom!'

At sight of these things the King was troubled in spirit, and dismay fell upon his attendants. While they were yet regarding the paintings, it seemed as if the figures began to move, and a faint sound of warlike tumult arose from the cloth, with the clash of cymbal and bray of trumpet, the neigh of steed and shout of army; but all was heard indistinctly, as if afar off, or in a reverie or dream. The more they gazed, the plainer became the motion, and the louder the noise; and the linen cloth rolled forth and amplified, and spread out, as it were, a mighty banner, and filled the hall, and mingled

with the air, until its texture was no longer visible, or appeared as a transparent cloud: and the shadowy figures became all in motion, and the din and uproar became fiercer and fiercer; and whether the whole were an animated picture, or a vision, or an array of embodied spirits, conjured up by supernatural power, no one present could tell. They beheld before them a great field of battle, where Christians and Moslems were engaged in deadly conflict. They heard the rush and tramp of steeds, the blast of trump and clarion, the clash of cymbal, and the stormy din of a thousand drums. There was the clash of swords, and maces, and battle-axes, with the whistling of arrows, and the hurling of darts and lances. The Christians quailed before the foe; the infidels pressed upon them and put them to utter rout; the standard of the Cross was cast down, the banner of Spain was trodden under foot, the air resounded with shouts of triumph, with yells of fury, and with the groans of dying men. Amidst the flying squadrons, King Roderick beheld a crowned warrior, whose back was turned towards him, but whose armour and devices were his own, and who was mounted on a white steed that resembled his own war-horse Orelia. In the confusion of the flight, the warrior was dismounted, and was no longer to be seen, and Orelia galloped wildly through the field of battle without a rider.

Roderick stayed to see no more, but rushed from the fatal hall, followed by his terrified attendants. They fled through the anti-chamber, where the gigantic figure with the whirling mace had disappeared from his pedestal; and on issuing into the open air, they found the two ancient guardians of the tower lying dead at the portal, as though they had been crushed by some mighty blow. All nature, which had been clear and serene, was now in wild uproar. The heavens were darkened by heavy clouds; loud bursts of thunder rent the air, and the earth was deluged with rain and rattling hail.

The King ordered that the iron portal should be closed ; but the door was immoveable, and the cavaliers were dismayed by the tremendous turmoil and the mingled shouts and groans that continued to prevail within. The King and his train hastened back to Toledo, pursued and pelted by the tempest. The mountains shook and echoed with the thunder, trees were uprooted and blown down, and the Tagus raged and roared and flowed above its banks. It seemed to the affrighted courtiers as if the phantom legions of the tower had issued forth and mingled with the storm ; for amidst the claps of thunder and the howling of the wind, they fancied they heard the sound of the drums and trumpets, the shouts of armies and the rush of steeds. Thus beaten by tempest and overwhelmed with horror, the King and his courtiers arrived at Toledo, clattering across the bridge of the Tagus, and entering the gate in headlong confusion, as though they had been pursued by an enemy.

In the morning the heavens were again serene, and all nature was restored to tranquility. The King, therefore, issued forth with his cavaliers, and took the road to the tower, followed by a great multitude, for he was anxious once more to close the iron door, and shut up those evils that threatened to overwhelm the land. But lo ! on coming in sight of the tower, a new wonder met their eyes. An eagle appeared high in the air, seeming to descend from heaven. He bore in his beak a burning brand, and lighting on the summit of the tower, fanned the fire with his wings. In a little while the edifice burst forth into a blaze, as though it had been built of rosin, and the flames mounted into the air with a brilliancy more dazzling than the sun ; nor did they cease until every stone was consumed, and the whole was reduced to a heap of ashes. Then there came a vast flight of birds, small of size, and sable of hue, darkening the sky like a cloud ; and they descended and wheeled in circles round the ashes, causing so great a wind with their

wings that the whole was borne up into the air and scattered throughout all Spain, and wherever a particle of these ashes fell it was as a stain of blood. It is furthermore recorded by ancient men and writers of former days, that all those on whom this dust fell were afterwards slain in battle, when the country was conquered by the Arabs, and that the destruction of this necromantic tower was a sign and token of the approaching perdition of Spain.

“Let all those,” concludes the cautious friar, “who question the verity of this most marvellous occurrence, consult those most admirable sources of our history, the chronicle of the Moor Rasis, and the work entitled, ‘The Fall of Spain,’ written by the Moor Abulcasim Tarif Abentarique. Let them consult, moreover, the venerable historian Bleda, and the cloud of other Catholic Spanish writers, who have treated of this event, and they will find I have related nothing that has not been printed and published under the inspection and sanction of our holy Mother Church. God alone knoweth the truth of these things; I speak nothing but what has been handed down to me from times of old.”

THE CHARACTER OF MAHOMET.

(From Washington Irving’s *Life of Mahomet*.)

“It is perfect abnegation of self, connected with this apparently heartfelt piety, running through the various phases of his fortune, which perplex one in forming a just estimate of Mahomet’s character.

However he betrayed the alloy of earth after he had worldly power at his command. The early aspirations of his spirit continually returned and bore him above all earthly things. Prayer, that vital duty of Islamism, and that infallible purifier of the soul, was his constant practice. ‘Trust in God’ was his comfort and support in

times of trial and despondency. On the clemency of God, we are told, he reposed all his hopes of supernal happiness. Ayesha relates that on one occasion she inquired of him, 'Oh, prophet, do none enter paradise but through God's mercy?' 'None—none—none!' replied he, with earnest and emphatic repetition. 'But you, oh prophet, will not *you* enter excepting through His compassion?' Then Mahomet put his hand upon his head, and replied three times with great solemnity, 'Neither shall I enter paradise unless God cover me with His mercy!'

"His military triumphs awakened no pride nor vain glory, as they would have done had they been effected for selfish purposes. In the time of his greatest power he maintained the same simplicity of manners and appearance as in the days of his adversity. So far from affecting regal state, he was displeased if, on entering a room, any unusual testimonial of respect were shown him. If he aimed at universal dominion, it was the dominion of the faith; as to the temporal rule which grew up in his hands, as he used without ostentation, so he took no step to perpetuate it in his family.

The riches which poured in upon him from tribute and the spoils of war were expended in promoting the victories of the faith, and in relieving the poor among its votaries; insomuch that his treasury was often drained of its last coin."

LOYOLISM AND SOCIAL CHRISTIANITY.

From the Introduction to Self-Renunciation. } The translation of a Treatise
By the Rev. T. T. Carter. } by Guílloré, the Jesuit.

"But while there are these marked and ineradicable distinctions between the holiest life in the world and the creation which finds its proper home in a Religious Community, it is not to be supposed that the roots out of"

“ which the two growths spring are different ; that there are not underlying both, manifestations of the Spirit similar principles, though assuming diverse shapes and features in many essential respects, and forming the occasion of distinct laws and rules of perfection.

Of all the principles thus connecting the two spheres of spiritual life, none is more characteristic or more vitally influential, than that which forms the subject-matter of this Treatise. For the surrender of self, not in outward act only, but also in inward conformity of will, is the groundwork of obedience, of patience under trial, of the sweetness of pure conversation, of gentleness and love under provocation, equally in the world and the home, as in a Religious Community. It is one of the special blessings of this latter form of life, that it subjects its votaries to a discipline of self unknown in other vocations, which, by its interior rules and constant calls to subordination, reaches even to the inward spirit, to the intellect and the senses ; for Religious Rule presses not only on all the out-goings of life, but also on its internal workings, the searching process of its training tending to bring every thought and desire into captivity as matters of distinct conscientious obligation, even in respect of tendencies and choices which are necessarily left perfectly free in other forms of life. It is indeed this principle in constant practical operation that gives to the Religious Life its distinctive characteristic of obedience, as a fruitful means of spiritual perfection.

But it is not therefore to be supposed that any true follower of Christ, aiming at a perfect conformity of will, may not in any sphere of life lay upon himself, as a voluntary discipline, a rule of self-abnegation, of the captive spirit of interior subjection, or poverty of will, to be kept as earnestly, though it be not sealed by a visible consecration. And to practise a perfect life in the sanctities of home and amid worldly occupations, depends ”

“on the same secret law which makes the true Religious, who attains the fulness of his union with his Lord in proportion as self is immolated and laid low at the foot of the Cross, after the example of His perfect sacrifice.

Such a disposition, therefore, is of primary importance in testing a desire for a Religious Life, and forms one of the surest guarantees of a true vocation. The important truth may serve to encourage those who, called, as they believe, to such a life, are restrained from seeking admission into it by unavoidable hindrances pressing, it may be, for an indefinite time. To such persons it is often a sore trial to suppose that the time of waiting is lost; that all preparation for the life so greatly desired must necessarily be delayed till they can enter on a specific training. In many details that constitute the Religious State this doubtless is true. But to suppose that the soul's progress towards the longed for end may not be most surely furthered by a faithful submission of the will to the yoke laid upon it, and to the many calls for self-sacrifice which accompany it, till the time of waiting is past, would be to mistake the very principle of the discipline of the soul.

That there are courses of religious instruction and specific habits of life, which properly belong only to the sphere of Religious Communities, is but to repeat the fact already assumed, of distinctive vocations in the kingdom of grace.

But if self-sacrifice for the love of Jesus be the underlying groundwork of all true preparations of the heart, then surely the trials of home and the exactions of the world may be used so as to further this end. There is a ceaseless call for self-surrender in the common round and the daily routine to one set on attaining this high state, in a sweet compliance with ordinary difficulties, in loving, patient, persevering yielding to the continual demands for forbearance or sympathy, such as every-day life in every”

“station ensures, which, accepted in faith and self forgetfulness, will be found to have produced, by the Grace of God, not only present peace but an ever-deepening spirituality, and to have secured in a grace most difficult of attainment a preparedness of heart for the Religious Life.

There are cases, perhaps the saddest one ever meets with among the phenomena of the spiritual life, of persons, ardent and enthusiastic, feeding on visions of heavenly things, which a diseased fancy ever luxuriantly suggests, sustaining themselves on self-exalting dreams of spiritual superiority to all around them, restless and dissatisfied with all at home and in the world around, thinking that they have only to escape from the irksome trammels of their enforced compliance with such a state, to make sure of unclaying happiness and easy self improvement under Religious rule; who have to learn that the cause of their home difficulty and murmurings of heart was really nothing else than an undisciplined and selfish nature, which only the more strikingly reveals itself when brought into contact with the profound practical truths and unsparing demands by which, in a religious obedience, every impulse must be met, and each fond dream tested.

And here, again, we may learn the answer to be given, and the cases to which it applies are not uncommon to those, who, earnest and true in their appointed course of life, yet fear continually less they are falling short of the glory shed around a lot wholly devoted to Religion; because their time and zeal are consumed in such trifling details and common incidents, with such scant, irregular, and interrupted opportunities of devotion, and with the prospect of the same apparently trivial aims filling up the whole earthly future of their lives. It would be beyond our present object to enter into explanations necessary to determine the relative value of different vocations in the”

“kingdom of God ; but it will surely help such persons to realize the truth that it is not so much the subject-matter as the spirit and inner law of life that constitutes its perfection.

There is an intended rivalry in a holy family life and that of a Religious Community. It is of God's ordering, in the dispensation of this present world, that Christ is to be served in both states of life, and that a perfect following of His example is open to His true disciples according as He leads them to follow Him in one or the other manifestations of His will.”

“To every one whom He calls the highest aim is open, though the way of perfection is more direct and free as the vocation is more or less openly dedicated to His service ; but in every case, however seemingly adverse or uncongenial to the soul's secret aspirations, the love of God and the steadfast conformity with His Will is the one law of all true perfection ; and the emptying of self, the completeness of self renunciation, the one necessary condition of all true advances in divine love and the imitation of Jesus, so none need fear lest he should fail or fall short in the race which is set before us if he can say of a truth, ‘I no longer live unto myself, but unto Him who died for me and rose again.’”

The preceding remarks introductory, as already stated, to the translation of a work by a very able Jesuit, exhibit the true intention and spirit of Loyola's scheme for modifying the ordinary conditions of the educational training belonging to man's terrestrial existence, so as to render that process more distinctly subjective with reference to the all-important purpose of preparation for the more perfect spiritual existence. Those remarks, however, will also serve in conjunction with all that has gone before to assist the reader in clearly defining and appreciating the meaning of the expressions ‘Religion,’ ‘Religious truth,’ ‘Religious life,’ &c. . . Religion may be said to be that

which teaches and belongs to an enlightened and strictly reasonable use of the will and of the intellectual faculties by the human-being. But no human-being can lead a perfectly religious life; it is indeed not consistent with the conditions of the terrestrial human existence that any man should be able to do so: it is what he is here expressly for the purpose of learning to do. But what he can do, and has to do, is . . . to try. The distinct recognition of the object and the constant persistent endeavour to work towards it, . . . to learn and to improve more and more, is what the most enlightened and most reasonable human being can do; and it is that which if he be truly enlightened and reasonable he will certainly do.

The object of this Essay is in some measure to point out that, in a general sense, all true sound human knowledge belongs to religious truth; and that all really useful work performed by a human-being belongs to a religious life... the work is performed in the service of the Creator. A man by acting reasonably and by working with industry and devotion may not only facilitate his own education, but, by assisting in the education of his fellow-men, may, even, facilitate the government of the Earth.

A clear apprehension of the religious character of all useful work and of the necessarily imperfect life of the most religious, will prevent a restriction of the meaning of the expression 'religious' in such a way as may be often-times very harmful, for example: a man who with much self-denial, great industry and devotion, is working, in what is called the service of science, with the object of extending and increasing scientific knowledge. To tell such a man that he is leading an altogether irreligious life, is to tell him what he feels sure must be in some degree unreasonable and wrong; he feels sure that the work he is doing is itself of a good character, and that his purpose is not selfish; that he is working with a desire to benefit his fellow-men, and to do that which he

conceives to be his duty. In fact, he is not irreligious but idolatrous ; he is engaged in the service of an idol, whether he call it by the name of science, philosophy, or by any other name, does not signify ; he may consider that he is doing what (is right in his own eyes) appears to him to be right, and therefore doing his duty ; but that is to make his own judgment his idol.

We think that many of those who thus expend their labour and their lives, would, on an assumption that they were acting unreasonably and wrongly, argue that they were justified because they were doing what they supposed to be right ; that they would believe in the Creator and in the Bible, if it were made clear to them that they should believe, and would then act differently. Now this is a point which we purpose to examine, briefly, with attention. It is a justification on a plea of ignorance... But of what character is the ignorance ? Is it wilful ignorance ? Because if a man wishes or intends to act in a particular manner, and is told there is a law against his so acting, and is told also, where he may find the law, and the man, nevertheless, neglects to inform himself as to the law and acts unlawfully in ignorance of the law, it is in that case wilful ignorance ; he cannot plead the innocency of ignorance, for he has wilfully neglected to make himself acquainted with the law.

The question comes up again... Why is it not all made plain ? If it be of such great importance for men to believe (what you call) the facts of Spiritual Theology... why are they not stated and explained so distinctly that there would be no difficulty about it ? Because a man is an intellectual being, and it is requisite for him to learn the use... the proper and legitimate use... of his will and his intellectual faculties. How is the use of his intellectual faculties to be learnt unless they be exercised ? And how is a man to be taught knowledge of a complicated and difficult character if he have not acquired knowledge

of a simple and elementary description? Can an uneducated child be at once taught to understand such a complex fact as the binomial theorem or the atomic-theory or the statement of any complex ideal fact unless he be first taught knowledge of a more simple kind? But in learning, the child, if he learn according to any sound system of education, learns to learn. He learns to submit himself to discipline, to study orderly and methodically; he finds that if he does not properly learn his lesson, it has been time lost and he must learn it again; he finds, also, that if he learns what is wrong it gives him trouble, and instead of advancing his knowledge, makes it more difficult for him to learn what is right. And again, can a man accomplish anything useful without exertion and endeavour? Can he learn a mechanical trade without labouriously learning the use of the tools belonging to that trade? or can a man engage successfully in business unless he submits himself to the rules of business? But the man of science does not, surely, require such examples as these, for where can he find a better illustration than in the study of science itself? Which of us would appreciate the inductive method if we did not know by and from experience that in no other way can science be built up? ... if we did not know that whenever the attempt has been made in any other way the result has been that no progress could be made that as soon as a small part of the edifice had, apparently, been built up it immediately fell down again. And what man, who knows anything about scientific investigation, expects to add to the common stock of knowledge without strict attention to the rules of investigation, and without industry and perseverance? What is now the most valuable part of scientific knowledge? Is it not the knowledge of the sound method by which knowledge can be increased? The man who has gone through a special training for scientific investigation knows well that strict mental discipline is

the particular and essential characteristic of that training. The student must have, or if he have not must acquire, patience, perseverance, zeal, mental activity, watchfulness, strict attention to the rules of investigation; he must learn to place his reliance firmly upon fact and reason, and to distrust mere appearance and plausibility, to divest his mind of prejudice, to reject no evidence which may belong to the result, to accept no (apparent) result as a conclusion unless it be strictly reasonable, and, lastly, he must learn to appreciate the great value of persistence. . . to have the conviction that if his investigation be orderly and legitimate, and he persists, his success eventually is sure. . . to fully trust the assurance, given long ago, that, though the night may be long and the wrestling severe, if he persist and continue to exert his strength, the morning light will at length appear and the angel of Truth declare his name.

Now the difference between investigations in Natural or General Science and investigations in Theology, is that the former consist in enquiring of God concerning His works through and by means of His laws; the latter consist in enquiring directly of God Himself concerning His personal relationship to men, and concerning the conditions of human existence.

Is it reasonable to suppose that rules which are found imperative and indispensable in the former, are quite unnecessary in the latter? Is it not more reasonable to assume that, from the higher, the extremely important, and sacred character of these last inquiries, attentive and careful compliance with the rules will be yet more strictly required?

To those who, having the advantages of education at the present day... having the evidence of the facts of science, of every department of science... and, having the instructions of well qualified teachers, not only of living teachers but of the works which have been written expressly for that purpose to guide them in the

application of that evidence,... to those who, having these advantages and pretending to have made the investigation for themselves, do not believe in the Bible as containing a revelation from God, a revelation of His relationship to man, and a declaration of His laws.... we have for the present nothing to say. But to those who have a distinct belief, in a general sense, that the Bible does contain such true divine revelation, we wish, before taking leave of the reader, to point out that they are thereby *reasonably* debarred from holding or entertaining any theory, doctrine, or judgment which is in any degree inconsistent with such fundamental belief in the Bible and in the God of the Bible. To entertain, to countenance a discussion of any such doctrine, or to be a party to any controversy into which such doctrine is introduced—unless it be to oppose it in the most uncompromising spirit,—is to treat the Revelation of God with contempt... it is to exhibit practical distrust in His wisdom and power,.. to pervert His most precious gift of reason, and to rebel against His most imperative commandment.

CENTRIFUGAL FORCE AND GRAVITATION

BY

(K U K L O S)

JOHN HARRIS.

Parts.

- THE LECTURE ... 1. The Attractive Force and Tangential Motion.
- *Supplement A. 2. The Planetary Axis of Rotation, and Plane of the
Ecliptic.
- Do. B. 3. The Neighbouring Stellar System, and Aberration
of Light.
- Do. C. 4. The Cometary Orbit of Revolution.
- Do. D. 5. { Parts I. & II. The Undulatory and other Theories
of Light.
Part III. Light, and other Manifestations of
Force.

* And the Appendix to Supplement A.

With numerous plates and diagrams.

THE CIRCLE AND STRAIGHT LINE.

1. The Geometrical Relationship Demonstrated.
2. The Construction of the Circle.
3. Conclusion.
4. Supplement.

